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1. Introduction 
When Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc and its subsidiaries filed a petition commencing 
Chapter 11 proceedings on 15 September 2008, it triggered innumerable immediate questions 
about how that insolvency and the insolvency of its related companies around the world 
would be resolved. Cross-border insolvency refers to the situation, such as in Lehman 
Brothers, where a company that holds assets or conducts business in different countries 
becomes insolvent. There is no global law to govern cross-border insolvency. Without a 
global law, each country’s laws apply to the assets of the company that are within the 
country’s jurisdictional reach. However, there have been some recent initiatives by 
international organizations that have resulted in some greater certainty for participants and 
courts in this area.
2
 
Cross-border insolvencies can range in complexity, and the law and procedures used to 
govern the insolvencies can be subject to varying levels of uncertainty. Multinational 
enterprise groups with distinct legal entities in multiple jurisdictions around the world present 
                                               
1
  Senior Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology. Many thanks to Sandeep Gopalan, Colin Anderson, 
Richard Johnstone, Adrian Walters and Christoph Henkel. 
2
  Notably, in 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promulgated 
its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law). The Model Law was adopted in the United States 
as Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. Forty countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, 
South Korea and Australia have so far adopted the Model Law. In a similar vein, the European Community 
Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 governs cross-border insolvency within the European Union. 
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the highest levels of complexity and uncertainty in cross-border insolvency. Another 
relatively complex proceeding may involve a main proceeding in the centre of main interests 
(COMI) of a single entity debtor with disparate secondary proceedings run in other 
jurisdictions to recoup assets in those jurisdictions. At the other end of the scale lie cross-
border insolvencies of single entities with perhaps only a single asset in one foreign 
jurisdiction. Such is the range of transaction types in the area. 
There are two broad competing approaches taken by different states to resolve cross-border 
insolvencies: universalism and territoriality. Firstly, universalism describes a way of 
governing cross-border insolvencies in which a proceeding in one jurisdiction, mainly where 
the debtor has its COMI, claims extra-territorial effect and purports to cover the debtor’s 
assets regardless of which country they are in.
3
 Pure universalism refers to the, as yet 
unachievable system, under which a single court applies a single law to govern the global 
assets of an entity. If assets are held in other jurisdictions, pure universalism necessarily must 
depend on other nations ceding sovereignty and jurisdiction over those assets to the country 
in which the debtor has its COMI. Because of this severe limitation, it only exists in modified 
forms in some countries. Those modified forms of universalism display varying levels of 
cooperation and coordination between and among courts, creditors, and insolvency 
practitioners to achieve a more, or less, integrated and coordinated approach to recovering 
and pooling assets. 
Secondly, the obverse approach to universalism is referred to as territoriality. Under this 
mode of governing cross-border insolvencies, creditors in each country where the debtor’s 
assets are located are left to commence proceedings to recover those assets within their own 
jurisdiction using that country’s own courts and laws. This can lead to multiple insolvency 
proceedings in different jurisdictions using different laws. Westbrook argued that, for those 
reasons, territoriality is inefficient.
4
 However, where territoriality applies, local creditors 
often receive the benefit of lower costs by utilizing local insolvency proceedings, and using 
local agents.
5
 Bebchuk and Guzman found that, in a territorialist system, creditors as a whole 
receive less in the winding up than they would under a universalist structure.
6
 However, this 
paper argues that, for some transaction types, a territorialist approach to collecting assets 
might be a more transaction cost efficient option. 
As a concession to the sovereignty of states, the Model Law contains a number of elements 
that adopt a territorialist approach; including ‘adequately protecting’ the interests of local 
creditors before debtor’s assets are entrusted to a foreign representative.7 Despite these 
concessions, the Model Law has not been accepted globally, and particularly not in emerging 
countries such as Brazil, Russia, India or China. This failure to achieve greater global 
                                               
3
  See ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW, p 782 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4
th
 ed 2011). 
4
  See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 2276, 
2320 (2000). 
5
  See Lynn M LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 2216. 
6
  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 775 (1999). 
7
  See Model Law, Article 21(2): ‘Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or non-main, the 
court may, at the request of the foreign representative, entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor's 
assets located in this State to the foreign representative or another person designated by the court, provided 
that the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected.’ 
(emphasis added). 
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purchase has itself created greater uncertainty in global trade.
8
 There are many hybrid forms 
of governance in between universalism and territoriality that adopt greater or lesser measures 
of cooperation and coordination respectively. These will be discussed in Part 3.4 below. 
Proponents of global solutions to cross-border insolvency, such as UNCITRAL in the Model 
Law, aim to make cross-border insolvency processes more efficient.
9
 For example, the Model 
Law aims to increase ‘cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of 
[enacting states] and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency’ and to 
increase the efficiency of the collection process.
10
 The question remains as to whether the 
various available modes of governing cross-border insolvencies are being used effectively to 
achieve those aims.  
This paper examines cross-border insolvencies through the lens of Williamson’s Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE).
11
 It makes three arguments: firstly, it identifies some tendencies in 
current cross-border insolvency practices that align with the TCE methodology. Secondly, 
based on a normative argument using TCE, it recommends some policy arguments to increase 
transaction cost efficiency of cross-border insolvency processes. Thirdly, it proposes a 
predictive tool that might be used to pre-empt the decision about how to govern particular 
cross-border insolvencies based on their transaction profile. Using TCE to analyse cross-
border insolvencies as proposed in this paper is novel. While various scholars have studied 
the relative efficiency of universalism and territoriality
12
 and others have concentrated on 
efficiency in insolvency law generally,
13
 none has studied the governance of cross-border 
insolvencies in a comparative way to predict the most transaction cost efficient governance 
mode for different cross-border insolvency transaction types. The policy benefits of obtaining 
greater transaction cost efficiencies in this area are self-evident, but include those three aims 
set out above. A TCE analysis is not a panacea and is not without its limitations, but it can 
add to the pantheon of economic analyses of insolvency laws, and cross-border insolvency 
law particularly, and has the potential to increase overall efficiency of cross-border 
                                               
8
  See Sandeep Gopalan & Michael Guihot, Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border Insolvency Law: A 
Proposal for Judicial Gap-Filling, 48 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1225, 1230 (2015). 
9
  Whether this is Wealth Maximisation, Pareto, Kalder-Hicks or some other type of efficiency is a contested 
point. However, the stated purposes of the Model Law as set out in § 1501 of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code include: 
(2)  greater legal certainty for trade and investment; 
(3)  fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors, 
and other interested entities, including the debtor; 
(4)  protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets; and 
(5)  facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and 
preserving employment. (emphasis added) 
10
  The Preamble to the Model Law states that it seeks to achieve, among other things, the ‘Fair and efficient 
administration of cross-border insolvencies …’ 
11
  See generally, OLIVER E WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, 
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (The Free Press, 1985); OLIVER E WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 
(Oxford University Press, 1996); and Oliver E Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: An Overview, in 
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (Peter G Klein ed. 2010). 
12 
 See Bebchuk & Guzman, JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, (1999); Westbrook, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 
(2000); Andrew T Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, see id. at 2177; Lynn M 
LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-universalist Perspective, 84 CORNELL LAW 
REVIEW 696 (1999); and LoPucki, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, (2000). 
13 
 For a good summary of law and economics studies of local insolvency systems (as opposed to cross-border 
insolvency), see John Armour, The Law and Economics of Corporate Insolvency: A Review, Working Paper 
No. 197 ESCR CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH 1 (2001). While Bebchuk and Guzman argue for purported 
efficiency advantages of universalism over territoriality, LoPucki argues that territoriality has its own 
efficiencies and argues against any purported superior efficiencies of universalism. See also Frank H 
Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 411 (1990). 
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insolvency governance. The next section of this paper introduces the building blocks of a 
TCE analysis. This methodology is expanded in detail in Parts 3 and 4 of the paper. 
TCE Methodology 
TCE does not propose simply reducing transaction costs. Instead, it adopts a comparative 
approach to study the efficiencies that flow from aligning alternative available governance 
structures, or modes, with different transaction types.
14
 For example, Masten argued that the 
‘correct question from a governance choice perspective, [using TCE] is “How does the 
performance of a firm that adopted a particular arrangement compare with how that same 
firm would have performed had it adopted an alternative?”’15 In the study of organizations, 
Williamson delineated three broad governance structures: a hierarchical governance structure 
(the firm), one of the many available hybrid forms of governance (long term contracts), and 
an open market approach (market). 
By analogy, the three broad modes of governance of cross-border insolvency for the purposes 
of a TCE analysis are: firstly, universalism with a single court system and a single law to 
govern disparate proceedings (the equivalent of hierarchy), secondly, modified universalism 
that displays more limited cooperation and coordination, for example through the Model Law 
(hybrid) and thirdly, territoriality under which the insolvency is conducted using local agents 
in a number of local jurisdictions in which the debtor’s assets are held (market). These are 
developed in Part 3 below. This paper makes a comparative analysis between these 
alternative governance structures in cross-border insolvency. In Part 4, the various 
transactions that make up a cross-border insolvency are studied and differentiated using the 
independent variables specified in the TCE methodology: asset specificity, uncertainty, 
complexity, and frequency. 
This paper proposes that an analysis of cross border insolvency using TCE will result in the 
following outcomes: firstly, a system of governance, such as universalism, that adopts (as 
nearly as possible) a single court in the COMI of the debtor using that jurisdiction’s law and 
facilitated by a single representative, will be the most transaction cost efficient means of 
governing the asset collecting transactions that display high levels of asset specificity and 
uncertainty, are highly complex and require frequent transactions to resolve. Conversely, a 
system of governance, such as territoriality, that adopts local collection and liquidation of 
local assets using local agents and local laws, will be the most transaction cost efficient 
means of governing the asset collecting transactions that display low levels of asset 
specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency. Thirdly, those asset collecting 
transactions that display intermediate levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and 
frequency will be best governed using hybrid modes of governance. Various modified or 
hybrid versions of universalism and territoriality have filled the void between universalism 
and territoriality and can be developed and applied as the circumstances dictate. Therefore, 
the choice of hybrid governance modes in a TCE analysis must lie somewhere between the 
ideals of universalism and territoriality and may yet require a new taxonomy to distinguish 
them.  
                                               
14
  See Oliver E Williamson, Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives, 20 STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 1087, 1090–1 (1999). 
15
  Scott E Masten, Transaction Costs, Mistakes, and Performance: Assessing the Importance of Governance, 
14 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS 119, 124 (1993) (emphasis in the original). 
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Example: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc Bankruptcy 
The various elements of governance modes and transaction types examined in a TCE analysis 
of cross-border insolvencies is exemplified in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Inc (LBHI) that commenced on 15 September 2008. The proceedings spawned over 80 
bankruptcy proceedings around the world
16
 involving companies within the Lehman Brothers 
Group. Before filing Chapter 11 proceedings, the Lehman Brothers Group consisted of ‘over 
7000 legal entities in 40 countries.’17 In one respect, the Lehman Brothers proceedings have 
provided a model for the dissolution of groups in insolvency because disparate Lehman 
Brothers entities entered a protocol with the parent company to ensure, as best they could, 
that these debtors cooperated among themselves (Protocol). According to a Lehman Brothers 
press release in May 2009, ‘the protocol attempts to alleviate both the disruption resulting 
from these filings as well as the lack of an international governing body with uniform 
oversight over these proceedings by ensuring cooperation and coordination among the 
various administrators.’18 On the other hand, several high profile entities, including Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) in the United Kingdom and administered by 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers, did not enter the Protocol. This decision not to buy into the 
Protocol becomes understandable when LBIE’s position is compared to the other Lehman 
Brothers entities. Unlike many other of the Lehman Brothers entities, LBIE will achieve a 
surplus of approximately £7 billion in the insolvency proceedings in the United Kingdom.
19
 
Arguments about how to distribute the surplus continue and the costs of those disputes 
continue to eke away at the surplus. 
If the TCE argument is correct, the LBHI bankruptcy was relatively more transaction cost 
efficient than it might have been in one respect because a more integrated mode of 
governance (the Protocol) was used. However, it was also less transaction cost efficient than 
it could have been if an even more integrated and hierarchical governance mode (such as pure 
universalism) had been available and was mandated. While the Lehman Brothers Protocol 
was effective in reaching broad agreement between many of the Lehman Brothers entities, it 
did not stop the practitioners and creditors of Lehman Brothers entities in some jurisdictions 
from holding out and seeking to attain the best outcomes possible for the separate entity. In 
fact, in some instances, it involved what might best be described as a strict territorialist 
approach in each separate jurisdiction in which a Lehman Brothers subsidiary conducted 
business. This, it is argued, would be the least transaction cost efficient approach for a 
transaction type such as the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. TCE predicts that transactions 
such as the Lehman Brothers insolvency will be less transaction cost efficient because they 
were not governed using the most integrated form of governance. 
Part 2 of this paper outlines the costs of cross-border insolvency. Part 3 examines the 
governance modes used in cross-border insolvency, including universalism and territoriality. 
                                               
16
  Debtors’ Amended Response to Objections to Approval of Proposed Disclosure Statement, In re Lehman 
Bros. Holdings, No. 08-13555 (Bankr. SDNY Aug 23, 2011), para [1], retrieved from 
http://bankrupt.com/misc/LBHI_SummaryRespDSObjections.pdf. 
17
  Lehman Brothers press release 26 May 2009 retrieved from 
http://dm.epiq11.com/LBH/Document/GetDocument/1315906. 
18
  Lehman Brothers press release 26 May 2009, note 17 above. 
19
  See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman Brothers International (Europe) – In Administration, joint 
administrators' 14th progress report, for the period from 15 March 2015 to 14 September 2015, (12 October 
2015), at 14, retrieved from http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/lbie-14th-progress-report.pdf. Also see Jill 
Treanor, ‘Lehman Brothers administrators left with £5bn surplus after creditors paid’, The Guardian, 
(5 March 2014), retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/05/lehman-brothers-
administrators-surplus-creditors-paid. 
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Part 4 then examines the independent variables of TCE analysis and applies them to 
transaction types typical in cross-border insolvencies. Part 5 sets out the way that transaction 
types align with governance modes in cross-border insolvency and discusses the Lehman 
Brothers insolvency by way of example. Part 6 separately proposes a normative argument for 
adopting pure universalism as a governance mode for highly complex and uncertain 
transaction types typical in multinational enterprise groups and Part 7 concludes. 
2. The costs of cross-border insolvency 
This Part outlines some of the transaction costs incurred in conducting cross-border 
insolvency transactions. Warren has noted that ‘[p]erhaps no part of the legal system is more 
cognizant of the transaction costs of collection and dispute resolution than the bankruptcy 
system, and surely no system is so conspicuously directed toward cost reduction’.20 Here, she 
is referring to a specific subset of costs; the professional costs that feature prominently in the 
reporting on insolvency, including cross-border insolvency.
21
 Professional fees may provide 
an indication of the work that has been performed to govern cross-border insolvencies and, in 
that sense, can provide a guage of transaction cost efficiency. The measure of professional 
fees should equate with the level and type of transactions involved in resolving the 
insolvency. High professional fees may indicate that a high level of work was required (for 
example to combat uncertainty and complexity) and that resolving the insolvency required a 
longer time and more frequent transactions than for a simple insolvency transaction.
22
 
However, if a high level of fees was charged for a simple transaction, then this may indicate 
that the governance mode used for the simple transaction was inappropriate. 
Transaction costs are incurred for a broader range of transactions than merely those that incur 
professional costs and fees ex-post the decision to liquidate a company. The transaction costs 
in cross-border insolvency include the costs incurred ex-ante and ex-post the decision to 
liquidate. While this paper concentrates on the ex-post costs of cross-border insolvency, the 
transaction costs that are incurred in relation to cross-border insolvencies include both ex-
ante and ex-post varieties. Williamson argued that ex-ante and ex-post costs ‘must be 
addressed simultaneously rather than sequentially’. Addressing the difficulty with quantifying 
both types of costs he said: 
The difficulty . . . is mitigated by the fact that transaction costs are always assessed on a 
comparative institutional way, in which one mode of contracting is compared with 
another. Accordingly, it is the difference between rather than the absolute magnitude of 
transaction costs that matters.
23
 
Both ex-ante and ex-post costs are considered in turn. 
                                               
20
  Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 336, 348 
(1993). 
21
  See the discussion of these costs in Part 2.2 below. 
22
  See Stephen J Lubben, Corporate Reorganization and Professional Fees, 82 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 
JOURNAL 77 (2008) who noted in relation to costs of bankruptcy that ‘[f]actors like the size of the debtor 
corporation, the number of professionals retained, and whether a committee is appointed play much bigger 
roles’. 
23
  WILLIAMSON, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 21–22 
(1985). 
 7 
 
2.1. Ex-ante costs 
Armour proposed that the legal responses to the costs of insolvency attend to the ‘ex-post 
costs of enforcement and those which seek to ensure efficient incentives ex-ante.’24 An 
example of an ex-ante transaction cost in cross-border insolvency would be the costs of 
negotiating and documenting a finance agreement that anticipates the possibility of cross-
border insolvency. The jurisdiction and choice of law questions are usually addressed in the 
contract and must be negotiated and documented. The costs of doing this are transaction 
costs. Other ex-ante costs include the costs associated with companies opportunistically 
structuring related entities within a multinational enterprise group to avoid the effects of 
insolvency. Another is the cost of a company shifting COMI pre-insolvency to avail itself of 
advantageous insolvency laws. These types of ex-ante costs are more likely to be incurred in 
transaction types with higher levels of uncertainty and complexity. Generally, these types of 
costs would likely not be incurred for simple loans to single entities for non-specific local 
assets.
25
 As this paper develops, it will become clear that it would not be transaction cost 
efficient to develop and implement highly integrated and complex governance modes to 
govern these simple transaction types. 
The costs of remedying opportunistic behaviour of corporate groups by seeking pooling 
orders or substantive consolidation are ex-post costs but the costs of creating the structures in 
which these behaviours can develop in the first place are incurred ex-ante. These 
opportunistic strategies include creating separate related entities in multiple jurisdictions to 
allay the risks of insolvency of the whole group, and structuring loan agreements for the 
benefit of secured creditors. 
Germane to cross-border insolvency, Chief Justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court, 
Spigelman J, as he then was, referred as a transaction cost in international litigation (not 
cross-border insolvency per se), to ‘the fear of the unknown [that] inhibits creditors when 
dealing with multinational corporations in the absence of a significant level of assurance that 
the difficulties of cross-border enforcement in insolvency will not impede the collection of 
debts’.26 Justice Spigelman stated that ‘one object of co-operation between courts in the 
context of transnational insolvency is to minimise these risks and transaction costs so that 
transnational trade and investment is not unduly burdened.’27 Here, his honour foreshadowed 
a TCE analysis.
28
 In doing so, he suggested a hybrid governance mode (a contractual 
assurance in relation to the debt) for a more complex and uncertain transaction type. He also 
cited as transaction costs to international trade the ‘the way the legal system impedes 
transnational trade and investment’ including in the following ways: 
 Uncertainty about the ability to enforce legal rights; 
 Additional layers of complexity; 
 Additional costs of enforcement; 
                                               
24
  Armour, ESCR CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH, 17 (2001). 
25
  For these simpler transactions, the choice of law and jurisdiction questions are typically included in the 
boilerplate provisions of the lender's contract and would be non-negotiable, there is no group structure and 
COMI will likely be difficult to change. 
26
  J J Spigelman, Cross-border Insolvency: Co-operation or Conflict?, 83 AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL 44, 44 
(2009). 
27
  id. at 45; see also Robert K Rasmussen, Where Are All the Transnational Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case 
for Universalism, 32 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 983 (2007). 
28
  ‘… without accepting the whole intellectual tool kit’. See J J Spigelman, Transaction Costs and 
International Litigation, 80 AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL 438, 438 (2006). 
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 Risks arising from unfamiliarity with foreign legal process; 
 Risks arising from unknown and unpredictable legal exposure; 
 Risks arising from lower levels of professional competence, including judicial 
competence; 
 Risks arising from inefficiencies in the administration of justice, and in some cases, of 
corruption.
29
 
To combat these transaction costs, Spigelman J suggested that courts should strive to achieve 
greater cooperation and coordination, or, in the language of TCE, a more integrated and 
hierarchical governance structure. His Honour argued that: 
When the official courts are engaged, as they traditionally are when insolvency 
intervenes, then the underlying commercial substance of the disputes that need to be 
resolved is often overlooked. A perspective of national sovereignty is given priority, 
because the courts are regarded as a manifestation of the state. This is why co-operation 
between courts becomes necessary in order to minimise the additional transaction costs 
that arise when an insolvency has cross-border elements. Such co-operation can only 
occur in the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction which, generally, requires express statutory 
provision.
30
 
Justice Spigelman also cited as a transaction cost, the cost of capital frozen in insolvency 
proceedings so that it cannot be used more efficiently.
31
 The costs raised by all of these 
factors outlined above might be classified as ex-ante transaction costs in international 
insolvency as these things must be considered by the parties when considering debt structures 
that factor in the possibility of insolvency proceedings. However, viewed another way, the 
various factors set out above can also be categorised as ex-post costs, as these risks 
materialise and become real costs at the time of insolvency. These costs do not go away at the 
point of insolvency. And it is these costs that might be reduced if appropriate governance 
modes can be used to govern the insolvency transactions. The parties in cross-border 
insolvencies must consider these factors, for example, when considering whether to cooperate 
with other parties or coordinate proceedings between jurisdictions after the decision to 
liquidate has been made. It is the ex-post costs (including the ex-post nature of those costs 
listed above) that are of especial interest in the TCE analysis in this paper. 
Williamson claimed that contracting to limit these hazards is subject to the bounded 
rationality of humans. That is, there are limits to what can be foreseen and contracted for in a 
contract of any duration, but particularly longer term contracts such as loan contracts. 
Bounded rationality is related to ‘opportunism’ which Williamson refers to as ‘self-interest 
seeking with guile’.32 An example might be the pre-emptive transfer of assets from one 
multinational enterprise (the first company) to a related entity to avoid having to disgorge 
assets when the first company becomes insolvent and enters insolvency proceedings. This is 
an ex-post cost. Unwinding this transaction, if it is possible, will incur costs ex-post. This 
possibility increases uncertainty in the insolvency transaction matrix and could, when 
considered with levels of asset specificity, require a more integrated governance mode. Both 
of these human fallibilities: bounded rationality and opportunism that are important features 
of TCE, will be discussed further in Part 4.2 below. Again, global initiatives to mitigate the 
                                               
29
  Spigelman, AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL, 44 (2009). 
30
  id. at 45. 
31
  id. at 45. 
32
  WILLIAMSON, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 47 (1985). 
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effect of these transaction costs stress greater cooperation and coordination between and 
among all parties.  
2.2. Ex-post costs 
Ex-post transaction costs in cross-border insolvencies include the costs of coordinating 
multiple cross-border proceedings in different jurisdictions.
33
 Ex-post costs include the costs 
of (1) creditor decision-making; (2) valuation mechanisms; (3) homogenisation of creditors’ 
claims and (4) maintaining pre-insolvency priorities such as the priority given to secured 
creditors.
34
 For example, ex-post transaction costs might include the costs of arranging and 
organising cooperation between and among courts and creditors, resolving conflicts of laws 
questions, as well as the costs incurred in collecting, valuing and selling assets, and pursuing 
preference claims. In the insolvency of a corporate group, ex-post costs might also include 
understanding the enterprise group structure and the transactions between corporate entities 
within the group, and seeking a pooling order or substantive consolidation of an enterprise 
group. 
The costs that arguably receive the most attention when transaction costs are considered, are 
the professional fees charged by insolvency professionals, including accountants and lawyers. 
However, as discussed by Lee, charging high fees does not necessarily equate to 
inefficiency.
35
 These insolvencies must be governed in one way or another and costs must be 
incurred to wind up the companies and recoup assets. The question to consider is whether the 
way cross-border insolvencies are conducted in each case is the most transaction cost 
efficient method. On one view, professional fees simply provide a dollar calculation, an 
indication, of what it cost to conduct the transactions to resolve the issues outlined above. In 
this way, they are not a separate species of costs but more a barometer of the work required to 
resolve a cross-border insolvency. TCE might provide guidance when these costs become 
disproportionate to the type of cross-border insolvency in question. For example, if the 
insolvency transactions are governed using a more (or less) integrated governance mode than 
that which is appropriate for the given transaction, higher transaction costs in the form of 
wasted fees will result. 
The professional costs alone of the largest cross-border insolvencies can reach into the 
billions of dollars. A study of 102 of the largest public company bankruptcies in the United 
States between 1998 and 2007 found that bankruptcy professional fees and expenses alone 
cost USD $5.5 billion.
36
 Another study estimated the direct costs of bankruptcy were on 
                                               
33
  The multiplicity of proceedings will be considered in more detail in Part 4.4 of this Paper in an analysis of 
the frequency of transactions – one of the independent variables of transaction types considered under TCE. 
34
  See Armour, ESCR CENTRE FOR BUSINESS RESEARCH, 19–31 (2001). 
35
  See Rachel Siew Lin Lee, How is "efficiency" determined in the insolvency context? Clarifying the meaning 
of efficiency with the conjunction of insolvency jurisprudence and economic methodology (2015) University 
of Queensland); see also Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer, 74 
OREGON LAW REVIEW 239 (1995) who seeks to debunk the description of lawyers (in her essay, 
transactional lawyers rather than insolvency lawyers) ‘as transaction cost’ by suggesting, at 248, that 
‘because their structural position in the market enables them to back their representations with a meaningful 
reputation bond, lawyers can function as cost efficient brokers who create value by increasing the amount 
and reliability of the operational and reputational information available to transactors while greatly reducing 
the pre-transaction search costs…’ 
36
  LYN M LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, 
ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION xiii (Oxford University Press, 2011). See also Lubben, AMERICAN 
BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL, 80 (2008) who noted in relation to costs of bankruptcy that ‘[f]actors like the 
size of the debtor corporation, the number of professionals retained, and whether a committee is appointed 
play much bigger roles’. 
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average ‘3.1% of the book value of the debt plus the market value of equity’ of the company 
in the year before insolvency.
37
 By way of example, in the 5 years since Lehman Brothers 
entered bankruptcy, it paid its lawyers, accountants and other insolvency professionals 
around USD $2.2 billion.
38
 Lehman’s is a complicated multi-party proceeding and the 
Modified Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its 
Affiliated Debtors filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
New York alone runs to some 390 pages.
39
 Lehman Brothers’ creditors are expected to 
receive 18 cents in the dollar by 2016 – 8 years after it entered bankruptcy.40 However, the 
multiplication of proceedings in different jurisdictions around the world has multiplied the 
costs and reduced the net pool of assets. This duplication increases transaction costs. 
The costs of governing large complex insolvencies are further illustrated by the recent 
Chapter 11 proceedings involving the Canadian telecommunications company, Nortel, which 
involved actions in the United States, Canada and Europe, in which the legal costs alone 
exceeded a billion dollars (or 10% of Nortel’s global estate), depriving creditors and other 
stakeholders of recovering this amount.
41
 Also, in both the Lehman Brothers and Nortel 
proceedings, a large amount of capital was (and continues to be) in the hands of the 
insolvency representatives for years waiting for disputes over its distribution to resolve. 
Again, according to Spigelman J, these dormant funds are a cost of the insolvency because 
the funds, if freed, could be used more profitably by entrepreneurs for the benefit of society. 
In a TCE analysis, transaction cost efficiencies flow once appropriate governance modes are 
used to govern relevant transaction types. TCE predicts that transactions that display high 
levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity and recur with high frequency are best 
governed using a more integrated governance mode. Conversely, those that display low levels 
of each will be best governed using the least integrated (and least costly) mode. Those 
transactions that display intermediate levels of each of these variables will best be governed 
using hybrid modes of governance that can account for these intermediate levels at moderate 
cost. In this way, some of the ex-ante or ex-post costs referred to above should be mitigated.  
TCE predicts that for highly uncertain and complex transactions where transaction specific 
assets are involved, such as the Lehman Brothers and Nortel proceedings, a more integrated 
mode of governance (such as pure universalism, as discussed in Part 6 below) could result in 
                                               
37
  Lawrence A Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 285, 299 (1990). 
38
  Erik Larson, ‘Lehman Recovery Seen as Justifying $2 Billion Bankruptcy’, Bloomberg (online), 
11 September 2013 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-11/lehman-recovery-seen-as-justifying-2-
billion-bankruptcy.html. 
39
  Epiq Systems, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc Chapter 11 general information page 
http://dm.epiq11.com/lehman/Project#. 
40
  See E Larson, note 38 above. However, Lubben argues that Chapter 11 is not that expensive, particularly ‘in 
comparison with the costs of other corporate transactions.’ See Stephen J Lubben, The Direct Costs of 
Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL 509, 550 (2000). 
41
  Jim Christie, ‘Slim odds for clawback of attorneys' fees in Nortel bankruptcy’, Reuters, May 28, 2015, at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/28/bankruptcy-nortel-idUSL1N0YJ0J120150528; Janet McFarland, 
‘Judges rip into squabbling Nortel lawyers’, Globe and Mail, May 14, 2015, at 
https://secure.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20150514/RBSWNORTELLAWYERS. See 
also Barry Critchley, ‘Will Nortel Professional Fees Finally Get Some Examination?’, Financial Post 
(online), 27 November 2013 http://business.financialpost.com/2013/11/27/will-nortel-professional-fees-
finally-get-some-examination/. The article quotes ‘independent financial analyst’ Diane Urquhart as saying: 
‘[h]ad this $1-billion been used for restructuring, Nortel would likely still be operating effectively and 
creating jobs for Canadian scientists and engineers.’ 
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greater transaction cost efficiencies. On the other hand, using a highly integrated mode of 
governance for a less complex transaction with low levels of uncertainty and asset specificity 
will also incur wasted and unnecessary transaction costs. It is akin to using an electrified nut 
cracking machine to crack a walnut when a rock would do the same job. In these instances 
professional fees must be questioned. If the appropriate governance mode is not chosen and 
costs increase, professional fees will increase accordingly and thus can provide measure of 
wasted costs. 
Masten claimed that, using a TCE analysis, ‘savings of 10–20% from choosing organizational 
arrangements discriminately are not unrealistic’.42 Having considered the types of transaction 
costs that might be incurred in cross-border insolvencies, a firmer understanding of the 
various governance modes is required. The available governance modes in cross-border 
insolvency are discussed in Part 3 below and the relative characteristics of cross-border 
insolvency transaction types are discussed in Part 4. 
3. Governance modes in cross-border insolvency 
The first step in a TCE analysis is to define the applicable governance modes.
43
 Governance 
modes differ in and can be distinguished by their ‘costs and competencies’.44 Williamson 
referred to the two main governance modes in the theory of the firm, ‘markets and hierarchies 
[as] polar modes’.45 TCE isolates integrated or hierarchical forms of governance and equates 
the firm, or the company, set up to manufacture products in-house, as the most integrated or 
hierarchical form of governance, and buying the product on the market as the least integrated 
form. In between these polar modes lay various hybrid governance modes, including long and 
short term contracts used as a means to corral the uncertainty and complexity inherent in 
various transaction types. 
The most relevant ways in which universalism and territoriality differ, for the purpose of a 
TCE analysis, is in the mode of governing the collection and liquidation of assets. That is, is 
the collection and liquidation most transaction cost efficient if conducted using a single 
central court and a single law or in different jurisdictions using multiple solutions? Despite 
their arguments promoting the superiority of their respective positions, Westbrook and 
LoPucki leave open the possibility that aspects of either system might be used depending on 
the transaction type involved.
46
 For some transaction types, the collection and liquidation of 
assets out of one jurisdiction, using one law will be the most transaction cost efficient way of 
governing the insolvency, while for other transaction types, allowing the collection and 
liquidation of assets to be conducted in local jurisdictions will be most transaction cost 
efficient. An analysis using TCE might be able to determine which is used and when. 
In cross-border insolvencies, Westbrook and LoPucki set out the costs and competencies of 
universalism and territoriality respectively. As discussed, Williamson described hierarchy 
and market as polar modes. Similarly, LoPucki calls territoriality ‘the antithesis of 
universalism’.47 Without more, this suggests that the costs and competencies of these 
                                               
42
  Masten, MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, 126 (1993). 
43
  Oliver E Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression, 100 THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 673, 679 (2010). 
44
  Oliver E Williamson, Comparative Economic Organisation: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives, 36 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 269, 277 (1991). 
45
  id. at 280. 
46
  See the arguments raised later in Part 3.2 and the balance of Part 3. 
47
  LoPucki, CORNELL LAW REVIEW, 701 (1999). 
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disparate governance modes differ and this part of the paper will further outline those 
differences.  
Two areas in which these systems of governance differ are in the levels of integration 
displayed by each and also, the setup costs. As discussed, the most integrated form of 
governance is pure universalism, where the cross-border insolvency is governed from one 
forum using one law. Conversely, the least integrated form of governance in cross-border 
insolvency is territoriality where each creditor is free to pursue its claim in its own 
jurisdiction. In relation to the setup costs of each governance mode,
48
 there will still be 
transaction cost efficiencies in attempting to implement more integrated governance modes in 
a territorialist state if the transaction type requires it. In those situations, the most integrated 
and hierarchical governance mode available might well be to attempt to coerce or to negotiate 
with the parties to enter cross-border insolvency agreements outside the strictures of court 
enforced procedures to facilitate cooperation with the principal proceedings or to run 
synthetic secondary proceedings in the principal proceedings to reduce transaction costs as 
much as possible. These hybrid governance measures are discussed in Part 3.4 below. 
The TCE analysis proposed in this paper invites a different perspective on the universalism 
versus territoriality debate. The balance of Part 3 discusses the antithetical approaches of 
universalism and territoriality and substantiates the use of these as choices rather than 
absolutes. Then, in turn, this Part discusses universalism as a governance mode (including the 
use of cross-border insolvency agreements), various hybrid means of governing cross-border 
insolvencies, and then territoriality. 
3.1. Delimitation 
As a normative argument for insolvency law, Jackson’s ‘creditors’ bargain’ theory modelled 
bankruptcy law as a system under which hypothetical creditors, ignorant of the order of the 
                                               
48
  See id. at 753. The costs associated with developing and implementing pure universalism have proved to be, 
as yet, prohibitive to developing such a unified system. Developing and implementing even the modified 
universalism in the form of the Model Law has been high. For example, the costs of those countries, 
organizations and individuals involved in developing, negotiating and documenting the Model Law from its 
seminal stages in the 1960s until it was completed in 1997 cannot be calculated. On a country level, it took 
more than 10 years for Australia, for example, to negotiate the Model Law into legislation. The costs of this 
cannot be calculated but would include the costs of meetings, negotiations, drafting, debating, and amending 
and implementing the legislation. Similarly, the costs of implementing the system into the court structure in 
the Australian system of State and Federal courts are not calculable but would include the costs of judges 
and the courts negotiating, drafting, amending and agreeing on the content of practice notes and other 
subordinate legislation. However, once the initial setup costs had been sunk, there would not be a need to 
continually incur those costs. It is also argued that accessing and using such a system could only be cost 
effective in certain circumstances. Conversely, territoriality has been the default mode of governance for 
cross-border insolvency around the world and therefore would cost nothing to implement. When 
implementing a TCE analysis then, a distinction might need to be drawn between dealing with states that 
have implemented a more universalist governance system – for example, those that have adopted the Model 
Law like the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia – and those that have remained 
territorialist such as Brazil, Russia, India or China for example. The transaction costs of implementing a 
universalist system in territorialist countries for a one off insolvency transaction might well remain 
prohibitive. However, striving to achieve more coordinated proceedings in territorialist countries might 
prove to be transaction cost efficient for certain types of transactions. The cost to implement a univeralist 
governance mode in a country that has adopted the Model Law would be relatively less costly because the 
setup costs are, as discussed, already sunk. It would often therefore be a more attractive option. Therefore, 
the state in which the insolvency laws are sought to be applied might impact the transaction costs of using 
one or another governance mode and different transaction cost results may, as a consequence, result for the 
same transaction type. This analysis is outside the scope of this paper. 
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priority of their claims, negotiate among themselves ex-ante, the position they would take in 
the event of bankruptcy.
49
 Jackson argued that the creditors’ initial impulse, to race to enforce 
their debt against the assets of the company, mirrors game theory’s prisoner’s dilemma in 
which individual participants act ‘out of immediate self interest in such a way that a less 
efficient solution results’.50 This, as is often the case, would result in the dissipation of the 
company’s assets and the loss of the value of the company as a going concern. As Jackson’s 
hypothetical creditors would not know whether they would win or lose the race to enforce 
and collect their debts from the common pool of assets, Jackson argued they would be better 
off to agree on a ‘government-imposed’ system which would stay individual actions against 
the debtor and impose a collective system of enforcement to maximise the value of the 
debtor’s assets.51 Jackson proposed that if bankruptcy laws mirrored the hypothetical 
creditors’ bargain to pool the assets of the debtor and distribute them equally in a pre-agreed 
order upon liquidation, then this would result in a ‘reduction of strategic costs; increased 
aggregate pool of assets; and administrative efficiencies’.52 As well as an argument for 
efficiency as a normative goal, Jackson’s arguments also raise the normative goals of having 
a system for collecting and pooling assets and for the equality of treatment for all creditors. 
These can be referred to as the principles of collectivity and equality of treatment. This raises 
two normative outcomes: firstly, the system of collectivity is preferred because it is efficient. 
Secondly, because the parties are opportunistic, a government mandated system is required to 
enforce the system. If this argument is accepted for an intra-state system as Jackson proposed 
in relation the bankruptcy system in the United States, then it may well equally apply in a 
global example despite differences in states’ political and normative positions. If left to 
individual states, agreement will never be achieved as individual state policy issues will 
always intrude. Therefore, some mandatory global system would be required. The TCE 
argument proposed in this paper therefore adds to the weight of argument in favour of 
adopting a global system of universalism. This argument is expanded in Part 6. 
In an analysis of cross-border insolvency, it is important to continue to apply the base 
normative principles for cross-border insolvency law: that is, the principles of efficiency, 
collectivity and equality of treatment.
53
 Pure territoriality suffers because it does not accord 
with the principles of collectivity (on a global basis) or of equality of treatment. It rejects the 
claims for a global pooling of assets and prefers the interests of local creditors above 
creditors in other jurisdictions. On that basis, pure territoriality must be discarded as a mode 
of governance in the normative argument raised in this paper and be replaced with a version 
of territoriality that comports with the normative principles of collectivity and equality of 
treatment. As a proxy, a modified form of universalism can mimic the effect of territoriality 
but will still comport with the three normative principles described above. In some 
applications of modified universalism, including in the Model Law,
54
 the interests of local 
creditors must be considered along with the interests of other creditors, but the overall aim of 
the process is to transfer assets to a global pool from which there can be a distribution to all 
creditors. This mode of governance where assets are collected by local agents using local 
laws and systems, is only part the system referred to generally as territoriality. The other 
elements of territoriality reject a collective pool of assets and global distribution. It is the 
                                               
49
  T H Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 857, 860 (1982) using the American term ‘bankruptcy’ to refer to corporate insolvency. 
50
  id. at 862. 
51
  id. at 858–61. 
52
  id. at 860–1. 
53
  See SANDEEP GOPALAN & MICHAEL GUIHOT, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 1–24 (LexisNexis, 2015). 
54
  See for example the Model Law, Article 21(2). 
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collection of assets that is the focus of the TCE analysis in this paper. Once that is done at the 
local level, the most efficient process is to mandate a collective system and equality of 
treatment of all creditors. This system of disparate collection processes in different 
jurisdictions that still submits to a system of collectivity will be referred to as territoriality. 
Pure universalism too must be discarded in a practical application of TCE. Pure universalism, 
on a global basis, no matter how normatively attractive it is, does not yet exist and is not 
likely to be implemented in the near future. Williamson argued that, when conducting a TCE 
analysis, ‘hypothetical ideals [should be removed] from the relevant comparison set’.55 
Williamson suggested the parameters must be set considering ‘obstacles of both political (real 
politick) and economic (setup cost) kinds’.56 The impediments to pure universalism in cost 
and real politick terms today appear insurmountable. However, a normative argument for the 
supremacy of pure universalism that results from this TCE analysis is set out in Part 6. 
When referring to universalism in this paper, it then must be to a modified kind. The kind that 
is available to the parties under the current limitations inherently imposed on it. This limited 
universalism will, as closely as possible, display characteristics of high levels of cooperation, 
and coordination, perhaps with proceedings in a single jurisdiction (based on the debtor’s 
COMI) and a single pool of assets for distribution to creditors on a global basis. Today, the 
use of the Model Law, and particularly in conjunction with cross-border insolvency 
agreements, seems to provide the opportunity for the parties to attain this most integrated 
form of governance available. The type of universalism prescribed in the Model Law stops 
short of pure universalism in a number of respects. Firstly, it contemplates multiple 
proceedings in different jurisdictions only coordinated under the auspices of the Model Law. 
Secondly, it provides a range of options that cater for the interests of local creditors at the 
expense of the global pool, presumably as a concession to the sovereignty of those nations 
that would adopt it as law.
57
 Therefore, it cannot rightly be classified as pure universalism. In 
this paper though, this most hierarchical and integrated form of governance will be referred to 
as universalism. 
The alternative governance modes proposed in this paper will therefore be, on one end of the 
spectrum, universalism (in the form closest to pure universalism that exists and can be 
implemented) as the integrated and hierarchical form of governance.
58
 On the other end of the 
spectrum will be territoriality;
59
 that is, a collection system under which the collection and 
liquidation of local assets is conducted in each separate jurisdiction but which still comports 
to the normative goals of collectivity and equality of treatment. 
3.2. Universalism and territoriality as options, not absolutes 
Westbrook and LoPucki argue from positional standpoints for the superiority of universalism 
and territoriality respectively. Each argues for full application of either universalism or 
territoriality for every type of insolvency transaction. However, this positional approach has 
                                               
55
  See the discussion in Part 2.5. See also, Oliver E Williamson, Pragmatic Methodology: A Sketch, with 
Applications to Transacton Cost Economics, 16 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 145, 153 (2009); 
see also Williamson, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1092 (1999). 
56
  Williamson, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY, 153 (2009); see also Williamson, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1092 (1999). 
57
  See Article 21(2) for example and the provisions dealing with coordination between disparate secondary 
insolvency proceedings. 
58
  For the sake of clarity, this modified version of pure universalism will be referred to as universalism. 
59
  Again, for the sake of clarity, this will be referred to as modified territoriality. 
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not moved the argument about governance of cross-border insolvency forward. By looking at 
the problem through the lens of TCE, a fresh perspective can be gained on these opposing 
viewpoints. This paper proposes that it is possible for universalism and territoriality (or 
pragmatic modifications of each) to both apply as different governance modes in cross-border 
insolvency depending on the type of transaction involved.
60
 Also, the intermediate modes that 
sit along the spectrum between universalism and territoriality can also apply as the 
transaction type requires. There is a range of these intermediate modes of governance 
available under the rubric of modified universalism – including under the Model Law. These 
are discussed in part 3.3 below. 
It is proposed that, under a TCE analysis, universalism and territoriality can become optional 
governance modes for different transaction types. That is, universalism will be a more 
transaction cost efficient governance mode for transactions that display high levels of asset 
specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency, while territoriality will be more 
transaction cost efficient for transactions that display low levels of each of these. 
Westbrook conceded that ‘the international bankruptcy system [that is pure universalism] 
might be limited to large, multinational companies, leaving local interests to be governed by 
local bankruptcy laws and policies.’61 This concession leaves the door ajar for an argument 
based upon a choice between universalism and territoriality as the transaction type requires, 
rather than an argument for universalism as the only means of governing all cross-border 
insolvencies. A further analysis of the arguments proposed for both universalism and 
territoriality illustrates the differences between them in cost and competence and also reveals 
that each theory leaves open the possibility of the other applying in certain circumstances. 
3.3. Universalism as a governance mode in cross-border insolvency 
Firstly, universalism describes a way of governing cross-border insolvencies in which a 
proceeding in one jurisdiction, namely, where the debtor has its centre of main interests 
(COMI), claims extra-territorial effect and purports to cover the debtor’s assets regardless of 
which country they are in.
62
 Its aim is to have a single pool of assets governed in one 
jurisdiction and distributed according to one country’s distribution laws but in some 
instances, this might not be possible. Pure universalism depends on other nations ceding 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over assets held in that country to the country in which the 
principal proceedings commenced. Because of the strong pull of sovereignty by all nations in 
relation to claims affecting their territory, universalism has only developed to date in 
modified forms, and is particularly prominent in the common law world. Sensing that the 
obstacles to pure universalism were, as at 2000, yet insurmountable, Westbrook proffered a 
number of modified alternatives to pure universalism as alternative governance structures.
63
 
                                               
60
  Williamson too argued that antithetical attitudes to governance would dissolve under a TCE argument. In 
Williamson, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 679 (2010) in relation to opposing governance modes in 
organisational development, he proposed that ‘Rather … than be trapped in the old ideological divide 
between markets or hierarchies, transaction cost economics treats the two as alternative modes of 
governance, markets and hierarchies, both of which have distinctive roles to play in a well working 
economy. The heretofore maligned mode of hierarchy is now awarded coequal status with the marvel of the 
market, the object being to deploy each appropriately’. 
61
  Westbrook, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 2310 (2000). 
62
  See GOODE, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 782 (2011). 
63
  Westbrook, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 2310 (2000). 
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As discussed, the type of universalism used as a governance mode in this paper is not pure 
universalism with a single forum and single law. It must be something less than that. The 
advantages of this limited universalism include that, given the right circumstances, there can 
indeed be a single insolvency representative, increased cooperation between all parties, and 
increased coordination of proceedings in different jurisdictions. This, by definition, falls short 
of pure universalism. 
Rasmussen argued against universalism that, because the ‘parties will contract around any set 
of rules the result must therefore be inefficient’.64 Westbrook criticised this and argued that 
Rasmussen: 
joins many others in giving us Coase Without Costs, ignoring the possibility that the 
rules may create a system that is sufficiently close to the most efficient possible that it is 
not worthwhile to contract around it or that it is worthwhile to do so in few enough cases 
that the default position creates more efficiency than it obstructs.’65 
Westbrook argues here for a limited universalism. This argument is akin to the first element 
of Williamson’s remediableness criterion — that there is ‘no feasible superior alternative 
[that] can be described’ or implemented.66 In the language of TCE, Westbrook argues that 
this limited universalism is the most transaction cost efficient governance mode possible. His 
concession may also be a self-defeating argument for pure universalism, as the systems of 
modified universalism now in place may, because of the real politick and economic costs of 
setup, be the most efficient means of governing cross-border insolvencies and that the extra 
costs that must be incurred to advance to pure universalism may remain too high. 
As proposed by Westbrook then, the form of limited universalism that demonstrates the 
highest levels of integration, cooperation, and coordination available to the parties, and as 
limited in this Part, forms the most integrated mode of governance available in a TCE 
analysis. One method of achieving the highest levels of integration, cooperation, and 
coordination in governing cross-border insolvencies is by using cross-border insolvency 
agreements.
67
 These are specifically endorsed by UNCITRAL in the Practice Guide as a 
means of achieving the greater cooperation referred to in Articles 25 and 26 of the Model 
Law.
68
 They are also discussed in the next section as an example of a hybrid form of 
governance; particularly when the transaction type only requires moderate contractual 
intervention and a limited form of cross-border insolvency agreement will suffice. The levels 
of integration achieved by using this type of univeralism may, in some circumstances, justify 
its use. Implementing this system though, is not without its costs. These elements are 
considered in the discussion below. 
The Model Law as a means of obtaining limited universalism 
The UNCITRAL Model Law provides the most pervasive attempt to implement universalism 
on a grand scale. Countries that have adopted the Model Law have already incurred the costs 
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  id. at 2303 paraphrasing Rasmussen’s argument. 
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  id. at 2303–4. 
66
  Williamson, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY, 153 (2009); see also Williamson, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 1092 (1999). 
67
  Article 25 of the Model Law states ‘In matters referred to in Article 1, the court shall cooperate to the 
maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign representatives…’ Article 27 then states: 
Cooperation referred to in articles 25 and 26 may be implemented by any appropriate means, including: 
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  UNCTRAL, Practice Guide, Chapter II, p 22 and Chapter III. 
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associated with adopting such regulation and have agreed to adopt universalist modes of 
governance in the form of access to foreign representatives, recognition of foreign 
proceedings, and increased cooperation and coordination between and among courts and 
representatives.
69
 There is no requirement for reciprocity under the Model Law. It aims to 
have principal proceedings governed in one jurisdiction (based upon the COMI of the debtor) 
with all other countries (those that have agreed to be bound by the Model Law) agreeing to 
give access, recognition, relief and cooperation to representatives and courts in the principal 
proceedings. 
As discussed, the Model Law was developed to give countries that have adopted it a modern, 
flexible and efficient law by which to govern cross-border insolvencies. According to the 
Guide to Enactment, ‘the Model Law respects the differences among national procedural 
laws and does not attempt a substantive unification of insolvency law. Rather, it provides a 
framework for cooperation between jurisdictions, offering solutions that help in several 
modest but significant ways and facilitate[s] and promote[s] a uniform approach to cross-
border insolvency.’70 That, in a TCE analysis, provides a gamut of governance modes. The 
Model Law provides options for debtors and creditors from which to choose. Under the 
Model Law as it stands, the parties can agree to adopt either a more or less integrated system 
of governance. It might involve implementing very high levels of cooperation and 
coordination or might only involve minimal use of cooperation between insolvency 
representatives to link local proceedings to a foreign main proceeding. 
The Model Law addresses four elements that, according to the Guide to Enactment, had been 
‘identified, through studies and consultations conducted in the early 1990s prior to the 
negotiation of the Model Law, as being the areas upon which international agreement might 
be possible’. Those elements include the following general rights afforded between foreign 
courts and representatives: 
1. access to local courts for representatives of foreign insolvency proceedings and for 
creditors and authorisation for representatives of local proceedings to seek 
assistance elsewhere; 
2. recognition of certain orders issued by foreign courts; 
3. relief to assist foreign proceedings; and 
4. cooperation among the courts of States where the debtor’s assets are located and 
coordination of concurrent proceedings.
71
 
The range of solutions available under the Model Law depends on the levels of cooperation 
and coordination that can be achieved by agreement between the parties or as approved or 
mandated by the courts. However, very high levels of cooperation and coordination between 
and among creditors and courts can be achieved, depending on the willingness of creditors, 
insolvency representatives and courts to take a commercial approach to resolving disputes. 
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  However, Bebchuk and Guzman noted that, while universalism might be more efficient than territoriality to 
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To date, governance modes such as those available under the Model Law
72
 provide the most 
hierarchical and integrated form of cross-border insolvency governance that can be 
employed.  
The next section will address various modifications to universalism as hybrid forms of 
governance. The balance of this Part discusses territoriality. 
3.4. Hybrid governance modes – modified universalism 
In between the two antithetical governance modes of universalism and territoriality lie 
various hybrid modes of governance displaying degrees of modifications to both universalism 
and territoriality. These governance modes will vary in cost and competence to implement 
and will display either more universalist or more territorialist characteristics depending on 
which end of the governance spectrum they congregate. It is very much a sliding scale of 
options between universalism and territoriality. 
Looking at the matter through the lens of TCE, these intermediate modes of governance 
should garner greater transaction cost efficiencies if they are aligned with appropriate 
transaction types. That is, those transactions that display higher levels of asset specificity, 
uncertainty, complexity and frequency would be best governed using a more integrated form 
of governance. Those that display lower levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
complexity would be better governed using less of the armoury of universalism available and 
therefore would incur fewer transaction costs. That is, it will arguably cost less to govern a 
single, simple transaction using local agents who deal with local assets under local laws, 
without incurring the costs of, for example, developing and implementing a complex cross-
border insolvency agreement. 
Cross-border insolvency agreements as an example of limited universalism 
Williamson stated that there is an assumption ‘common to both law and economics, that the 
legal system enforces promises in a knowledgeable, sophisticated, and low-cost way.’73 
However, he warned that ‘this convenient assumption is commonly contradicted by the facts 
— on which account additional or alternative modes of governance have arisen’.74 The 
parties to modern, complex cross-border insolvencies have developed alternative means by 
which to resolve (at least portions of) cross-border insolvencies outside the constraints of the 
court processes. One such method is the use of cross-border insolvency agreements under 
which the parties agree ex-post on efficient means of resolving the insolvency.
75
 However, 
these agreements rely on formal insolvency systems backed by the courts as the means of 
coercing compliance and ultimate enforcement. 
The UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation
76
 defines cross-
border insolvency agreements as ‘agreements entered into for the purpose of facilitating 
cross-border cooperation and coordination of multiple insolvency proceedings in different 
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States concerning the same debtor.’77 The Practice Guide provides examples of the types of 
cooperation and coordination available to the parties under Article 27 of the Model Law. The 
types of cases in which cross-border insolvency agreements are used are often large, complex 
transactions with high levels of asset specificity and a propensity for uncertainty. The 
Practice Guide claims that cross-border insolvency agreements: 
… are designed to assist in the management of … proceedings and are intended to reflect 
the harmonization of procedural rather than substantive issues between the jurisdictions 
involved (although in limited circumstances, substantive issues may also be addressed). 
They vary in form (written or oral) and scope (generic to specific) and may be entered 
into by different parties. Simple generic agreements may emphasize the need for close 
cooperation between the parties, without addressing specific issues, while more detailed, 
specific agreements establish a framework of principles to govern multiple insolvency 
proceedings and may be approved by the courts involved.
78
 
As can be seen, the levels of integration, cooperation and coordination can vary, depending 
on the ability of the parties to the proceedings to agree. Highly detailed agreements can be 
used in the most complex proceedings while simple agreements can be most cost efficient 
when used to govern simpler transactions. This aligns with a TCE analysis. In that vein, the 
Practice Guide also states that the use of cross-border insolvency agreements: 
… has effectively reduced the cost of litigation and enabled parties to focus on the 
conduct of the insolvency proceedings, rather than on resolving conflict of laws and 
other similar disputes. As such, they are considered by many practitioners who have been 
involved with their use as the key to developing appropriate solutions for particular cases 
...
79
 
The objectives sought to be obtained by using cross-border insolvency agreements emphasise 
the efficiency gains attainable through their use and include: 
(a)  To promote certainty and efficiency with respect to management and 
administration of the proceedings; 
(b)  To help clarify the expectations of parties; 
(c)  To reduce disputes and promote their effective resolution where they do 
occur; 
(d)  To assist in preventing jurisdictional conflict; 
(f)  To assist in achieving cost savings by avoiding duplication of effort and 
competition for assets and avoiding unnecessary delay; 
(g)  To promote mutual respect for the independence and integrity of the courts 
and avoid jurisdictional conflicts; 
(h)  To promote international cooperation and understanding between judges 
presiding over the proceedings and between the insolvency representatives of 
those proceedings; 
(i)  To contribute to the maximization of value of the estate.
80
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As can be seen, these aims neatly align with the aims of increasing the efficiency of cross-
border insolvencies and address many of the transaction costs outlined in Part 2 of this Paper. 
On a TCE analysis, implementing cross-border insolvency agreements can be seen to counter 
elements of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency in cross-border 
insolvencies. These variables are discussed in detail in Part 4 below. 
As referred to in the Practice Guide cross-border insolvency agreements are more effective in 
‘particular cases’; ‘those involving multiple plenary proceedings; ancillary proceedings 
commenced in different States affecting the same parties; main and non-main insolvency 
proceedings; insolvency proceedings in one State and non-insolvency proceedings with 
respect to the same debtor in another State; and insolvency proceedings with respect to 
enterprise groups.’81 Those cases are ones that display complex transactional characteristics 
that are open to uncertainty. Cross-border insolvency agreements will be the most efficient 
governance mode when used in transactions that involve specific assets with high uncertainty 
and complexity and in relation to which transactions frequently recur. This use of integrated 
governance modes for more uncertain and complex transaction types too appears to be 
broadly consistent with a TCE analysis. 
As has been shown, contractual arrangements are subject to bounded rationality and 
opportunism as it is impossible to contract for an unlimited number of unknown factors that 
might happen in the future. Therefore, leaving the solution to governing transaction types 
with intermediate levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency to 
contract will, at a certain point, be less transaction cost efficient than governing the 
transaction through pure universalism. This, again, adds to the normative desirability of 
creating a system of pure universalism. This idea is developed further in Part 6 below. 
Another mode of governance that might be described as hybrid in these circumstances, is the 
use of synthetic proceedings to avoid the costs of full secondary proceedings. 
Synthetic proceedings as a hybrid mode of governance 
The use of hybrid governance modes is particularly relevant where the state in which the 
assets are located is a territorialist state. In those instances, the insolvency representative who 
has been appointed in the COMI of the debtor has no control over secondary proceedings that 
must be commenced to deal with the assets in that jurisdiction. In those proceedings, without 
some intervention, local creditors’ interests will be met before any excess funds will be 
repatriated to the global pool of assets. The costs of implementing a universalist system in 
these circumstances would be out of the hands of the foreign representatives and creditors 
and, anyway, would be too costly to implement on any level for a single transaction. In order 
to combat these costs of duplicate secondary proceedings, parties to cross-border insolvencies 
have begun to implement novel solutions. For example, in some cases, creditors in 
jurisdictions where secondary proceedings can be commenced have agreed to the conduct of 
synthetic secondary proceedings within the principal proceedings. The synthetic secondary 
proceedings mimic the result that would have been achieved if the secondary proceedings had 
been conducted and distributions had been made to the local creditors. However, it is argued, 
that the transaction costs of running the secondary proceedings, and the uncertainty of dealing 
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with a foreign legal system and judges are avoided.
82
 This novel solution might be 
categorised as a hybrid form of governance in TCE terms. 
By way of example, in Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA Collins
83
 Collins & Aikman was a 
closely linked group of companies that supplied automotive components. It had its COMI in 
the United Kingdom. Within the group there were 24 companies spread over 10 countries in 
Europe. On 15 July 2005 the 24 European companies applied to the High Court in England 
for administration orders. The administrators sought to adopt a coordinated approach to the 
proceedings. Under the European Insolvency Regulation, creditors were entitled to open 
secondary proceedings in the countries in which they had an establishment. However, the 
administrators sought assurances from creditors in the other jurisdictions that they would not 
commence secondary proceedings if ‘their respective financial positions as creditors under 
the relevant local law would as far as possible be respected in the English administration’.84 
The creditors gave the assurances. Lindsay J outlined the effect of what, in effect, were 
synthetic proceedings conducted in the main proceedings: 
With only minor exceptions creditors did not seek to open secondary proceedings or take 
other divisive steps but rather supported the broad strategy which the Joint 
Administrators had proposed. The Joint Administrators attribute both that degree of 
restraint on the creditors' parts and the degree of support which they achieved to such 
assurances so given, which enabled them to conduct sales achieving very favourable 
realisations, in all some $45m more than had been the estimates that they had received. 
The Joint Administrators are of the view that the giving of the assurances was of critical 
importance to that successful execution of the administration strategy.
85
 
Apart from the saving of $45 million, Pottow argued the other benefits of conducting the 
synthetic proceedings in Collins & Aikman thus: 
The treatment of the claims was therefore the same economically as if a secondary 
proceeding had been opened, i.e., they were synthetically resolved. Yet there were two 
important distinctions: first, considerable cost was saved (likely to the pleasure of C&A 
creditors and disappointment of the Spanish insolvency bar); and second, control was 
preserved by the British decision-makers (the lawyers, principals, and judge), without 
risk of having a Spanish court inject unpredictability into the matter.
86
 
In terms of a TCE analysis, a more integrated and coordinated governance of the proceedings 
by means of obtaining assurances and conducting synthetic proceedings within the main 
proceedings, was a transaction cost efficient means of avoiding high levels of uncertainty and 
complexity in the mooted secondary proceedings. This alignment of governance mode to 
transaction type leads to a more transaction cost efficient outcome. 
Apart from the obvious setup costs and the costs of organising, documenting, and 
implementing a universalist structure, the disadvantages of limited universalism as the sole 
governance mode for cross-border insolvency are self-evident when considered from the 
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perspective of individual local creditors, especially small creditors trying to pursue their 
claims in a foreign insolvency proceeding. For those creditors, a universalist proceeding 
becomes a foreign proceeding — one in which the creditors are subject to all of the 
transaction costs listed by Spigelman J in Part 2 above. Using the example of individual local 
creditors in foreign proceedings, the local creditors must gain access to the foreign court, 
perhaps using a foreign language, foreign law and foreign procedures. Seen from this angle, it 
seems to shift the arguments for universalism on their head and in the bargain shifts the costs 
of universalism onto the creditors instead of the debtor; arguably resulting in greater, rather 
than less uncertainty for these creditors in the process. In answer to these concerns, 
Westbrook argued, perhaps unsatisfactorily, that these disadvantages will even out in a 
‘rough wash’87 so that those that lose out in one insolvency will be countered by those that 
gain in another. The Model Law provides concessions that can approximate the effect of 
territoriality to address these very concerns of sovereign nations and the local creditors within 
those jurisdictions. 
TCE analyses the various governance structures in relation to one another to determine which 
is most transaction cost efficient to govern the given transaction type. It is argued that a 
greater level of certainty and greater transaction cost efficiencies will arise by applying these 
hybrid modes of governance to transaction types that display intermediate levels of asset 
specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency. These governance structures involve 
various forms of cooperation and coordination between and among courts and insolvency 
practitioners. The various permutations of cooperation and coordination available under the 
Model Law provide an example of hybrid governance modes in cross-border insolvencies. 
At the other end of the cross-border insolvency governance spectrum to universalism, is 
territoriality. This mode of governing asset collection in cross-border insolvencies, it will be 
argued, is most effective and transaction cost efficient when applied to simple transactions 
that display low levels of uncertainty and complexity and involve one-off or very few 
transactions. 
3.5. Modified territoriality as a governance mode in TCE 
LoPucki described territoriality as a system in which ‘each country would have jurisdiction 
over the portion of the bankrupt multinational firm within its borders.’88 This approach is at 
the opposite end of the spectrum to pure universalism. Like that approach though, it is 
unlikely that it would apply without modification. Most states are amendable to some form of 
cooperation with other states, particularly once the local interests of local creditors have been 
fully accounted for.
89
 LoPucki argued that territoriality was the natural state of the law in the 
world today. He opined that ‘[i]n each case, each country’s bankruptcy court would decide 
whether to participate in a transnational effort at reorganisation or liquidation or to conduct a 
local reorganisation or liquidation according to local law.’90 This latter notion defines the 
cooperative element in LoPucki’s concession to universalism; what he calls ‘cooperative 
territoriality’. Under cooperative territoriality, LoPucki argued, courts are free to cooperate 
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with other states’ courts at their discretion. However, any system that relies on such an 
arbitrary approach cannot be called a system. It is for this and the other reasons discussed 
above about its failure to comply with the normative goals of collectivity and equality of 
treatment that pure territoriality has been rejected as a governance mode in this paper. 
According to LoPucki, the advantages of a modified form of territoriality in which the assets 
are collected in different states using local agents and local laws, include ‘greater 
predictability to lenders’ and ‘[i]n place of universalism’s complex domestic interface, … 
territoriality offers transactional simplicity. Domestic law would govern wholly domestic 
transactions.’91 LoPucki claimed that ‘the greatest advantage of … territoriality is that 
implementation would require only minimal changes in current practices… and [countries 
that] adopt domestic laws authorising narrow forms of cooperation [would] directly [benefit] 
their own citizens.’92 In TCE terms, territoriality provides a transaction cost efficient means 
of governing transactions that display low asset specificity and where uncertainty, complexity 
and frequency are low. 
As discussed, the type of assets involved in a cross-border insolvency are also an important 
consideration in a TCE analysis. In response to criticisms by Westbrook and Guzman that 
locating assets in a territorialist system is ‘problematic’,93 LoPucki stated that ‘is certainly not 
true of tangible assets, such as factories, equipment, and inventory.’94 There is the rub! Using 
local proceedings to collect and liquidate local assets would have transaction cost benefits for 
some transaction types. In a TCE framework, LoPucki’s defence singles out the particular 
effectiveness of territoriality in relation to asset collection transactions that show low levels 
of uncertainty and complexity and whose liquidation would only require very few 
transactions.
95
 Again, this supports a TCE analysis. TCE predicts that a non-hierarchical 
(market) system is the most appropriate when dealing with these types of assets – that is, 
assets that display low levels of asset specificity. It is therefore argued that using territoriality 
in these circumstances would effect transaction cost efficiencies. Transaction cost savings 
occur because the proceedings would be conducted by local professionals using local 
governance mechanisms such as local courts at a cost less than that to engage foreign 
representatives in foreign courts applying foreign law. Under a territorialist approach, assets 
the subject of the proceedings would be valued, priced and sold under local conditions to 
local buyers. In this way, the parties would economise on costs. The rough wash argument 
raised by Westbrook in support of universalism must wash both ways too, so that it must also 
apply to a territorialist approach. To paraphrase Westbrook, sometimes foreign creditors 
would receive more and sometimes they would receive less under territoriality and in a rough 
wash, this would even out over time.
96
 
As discussed, territoriality is the default governance mode in many jurisdictions around the 
world. Court decisions, even in Australia which has adopted a universalist approach by 
adopting the Model Law, have applied territorialist views when the interests of local creditors 
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have been threatened.
97
 The Model Law, which purports to adopt a universalist approach, 
arguably provides a concession to territoriality in that it contains a number of articles that 
require the courts to consider the interests of local creditors.
98
 However, as was seen in 
Ackers v Saad Investments Company Limited
,99
 applying the Model Law to a proceeding that 
involved a simple local tax debt in Australia caused the parties to incur significant transaction 
costs in two separate failed applications to the Federal Court of Australia,
100
 an unsuccessful 
appeal to the Full Federal Court
101
 and a further unsuccessful application for special leave to 
appeal to the High Court of Australia. It could be argued that a territorialist application of 
local Australian law (the ultimate result anyway) in such a proceeding might have avoided 
these wasted costs. 
Pottow argued that modified universalism, as displayed in the Model Law, makes certain 
concessions to territoriality in the form of ‘choice of law carve-outs and secondary 
proceedings’.102 He argued that ‘when (but only when) the contingency arises that a local 
creditor possessing claims under local law chooses to open a secondary proceeding, then (but 
only then) the COMI state insolvency law will be presumptively displaced in favour of the 
local state’s insolvency law’.103 Pottow rationalised the secondary proceedings concessions as 
‘a necessary evil: a pitstop on the road toward universalism that was required to secure the 
buy-in of sceptical states.’ 104 Pottow argued further that ‘[f]or the modified universalist, 
secondary proceedings should be tolerated, but they should be slowly, in successive waves of 
reform, restricted in scope’.105 However, this paper proposes that, on a TCE analysis, this 
type of territoriality could provide transaction cost efficiencies if used in relation to specific 
transaction types so long as the principles of collectivity and equality of treatment are 
adhered to. 
Summary of territoriality position 
Westbrook argued of territoriality that ‘claims must be made, and administration and 
litigation must be conducted, in multiple jurisdictions at far greater cost.’106 That is, the 
duplication of proceedings will drive up costs overall. These costs are unavoidable when 
dealing with a country that maintains a territorialist position. In these circumstances, the 
parties must strive to attain the most integrated form of governance with the highest level of 
cooperation and coordination available to them. Some of the hybrid forms of governance 
available are discussed above. Westbrook also criticised territoriality on the basis that it 
complicates the choice of law question: 
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… because the territorial system requires that many courts decide what law applies to 
various assets and transactions rather than having most, if not all, of those decisions 
concentrated in the main proceeding. Thus we could look forward to six countries 
claiming the right to apply preference law to one pre–bankruptcy payment, with three 
deciding it was preferential and recoverable and three deciding it was not. That result 
creates large inefficiencies, ex-ante and ex-post. Modified universalism offers a 
substantial chance of avoiding such results, because it will often result in a single court 
resolving such issues.
107
 
This outcome, where one court would resolve preference claims in multiple jurisdictions is 
more a goal of, the yet unattainable, pure universalism. A single court with global reach and 
jurisdiction would be able to resolve these types of complex claims but, until such a court is 
in place and all jurisdictions cede their rights to adjudicate on preference claims, that system 
remains an ideal rather than a practicality. However, a TCE analysis of complex cross-border 
insolvencies supports the argument that this integrated and hierarchical system of 
universalism would be the most transaction cost efficient means of governing complex 
proceedings involving multiple preference claims. Issues of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
complexity must also be considered in the analysis. Westbrook gives the example of a 
complex transaction open to a high degree of uncertainty. He is arguably correct to assert that 
using territoriality for this transaction type might be transaction cost inefficient. However, as 
discussed, a great deal will depend on the degree of asset specificity of the transactions 
making up the cross-border insolvency in combination with levels of uncertainty. A number 
of high profile cases have ended in extremely complex arguments about choice of law in 
competing courts in different jurisdictions
108
 even in jurisdictions that have purportedly 
adopted a universalist approach.
109
 These arguments have arguably driven transaction costs 
higher because of the territorialist attitudes displayed by courts. Given higher levels of asset 
specificity, universalism or modified universalism might well have been the most transaction 
cost efficient means of governing these types of complex and uncertain transactions. Thus, 
Westbrook’s assertion may well be correct, in relation to the particular transaction type he 
cites. 
However, as argued above, the type of asset collection system available under a system of 
territoriality might well be the most cost efficient means of governing transactions where 
asset specificity is low, which would benefit from local knowledge and the application of 
local law in each jurisdiction. Thus, both Westbrook and LoPucki may be at cross purposes 
and may both be correct, depending on the transaction type in question. 
3.6. Summary 
Which governance mode should be used to govern a particular cross-border insolvency 
transaction will depend on the characteristics of the transaction type of the cross-border 
insolvency in question. For these reasons, the spectrum of governance modes available in a 
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TCE analysis of cross-border insolvency range from highly integrated but limited 
universalism on one end of the spectrum and a modified form of territoriality at the other. 
Various hybrid forms of governance in between can govern the transaction types displaying 
intermediate levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency. A closer 
analysis of these transaction type variables is required. 
4. Transaction types in cross-border insolvency 
Once the governance modes have been defined, (limited universalism, modified territoriality 
and the various hybrid modifications in between) it is necessary to differentiate the various 
cross-border insolvency transaction types using the independent variables prescribed in the 
TCE methodology: ‘asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency’.110 TCE 
predicts that those transactions displaying high degrees of each variable should be aligned 
with a more integrated governance mode such as universalism, ‘so as to effect [a transaction 
cost] economizing result’.111 Conversely, it is anticipated that those cross-border insolvency 
transactions that display low concentrations of each variable will not require the full arsenal 
of universalist machinery and would be most efficiently governed using a less integrated 
mode of governance such as modified territoriality. 
Williamson argued that TCE provided ‘rational economic reasons for organising some 
transactions one way and other transactions another’112 and then proposed that TCE provided 
predictive qualities to determine ‘which go where and for what reason?’113 Those predictive 
qualities require the parties to identify and explicate ‘the factors responsible for differences 
among transactions’. 114 Williamson argued that those factors, which ‘apply to transactions of 
all kinds’115 are the ‘frequency with which transactions recur, the uncertainty to which 
transactions are subject, and the type and degree of asset specificity involved in supplying the 
good or service in question’.116 For the reasons discussed in Part 4.3 below, complexity has 
been added in this paper as an independent variable. 
In cross-border insolvency transactions, we should then be able to predict that more 
integrated governance modes (such as universalism) should be used to govern transactions 
that display the features of higher degrees of asset specificity, greater uncertainty and higher 
complexity and frequency. Those with intermediate levels of each element will be governed 
using hybrid modes
117
 and those with low levels of each can be most transaction cost 
efficiently governed using territoriality. Each of these characteristics of transactions will be 
discussed in turn. 
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4.1. Asset specificity 
Williamson placed special emphasis on the presence of asset specificity in TCE. Asset 
specificity, he stated, refers to ‘the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative 
uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value’.118 Pisano studied the 
combination of what he referred to as ‘transaction-specific investments under conditions of 
uncertainty’.119 When studying asset specificity, the emphasis is on the investments made in 
the transactions themselves. Also, the interaction of asset specificity and uncertainty is a focal 
point of TCE. Thus Joskow referred to the ‘combination of durable relationship-specific 
investments, uncertainty about future demand and cost realizations, and contractual 
incompleteness arising from the costs of writing, monitoring and enforcing full contingent 
claims contracts …’120 This highlights the nature of TCE as protecting investment in assets 
and the concomitant relationship that builds up around that specific investment. That 
investment creates or imbues the asset with transaction specific qualities. Williamson argued 
that ‘asset specificity increases the transaction costs of all forms of governance’121 and 
ultimately distilled six types by way of example: 
(1)  site specificity, as where successive stations are located in a cheek by jowl 
relation to each other so as to economise on inventory and transportation 
expenses;  
(2)  physical asset specificity, such as specialised dies that are required to produce 
a component;  
(3)  human asset specificity that arises in learning by doing;  
(4)  brand-name capital;  
(5)  dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in general-purpose plant that 
are made at the behest of a particular customer; and  
(6)  temporal specificity, which is akin to technological non-separability and can 
be thought of as a type of site specificity in which timely responsiveness by 
on-site human assets is vital.
122
 
Williamson said of asset specificity that ‘investments in labor (transaction specific human 
capital) can be highly specific’123 — the specialist analysts in the Lehman Brothers 
insolvency for example. Williamson also noted that ‘… many costs that for accounting 
purposes are reported to be fixed are in fact non-specific, hence can be recovered (salvaged) 
by redeployment. Durable but mobile assets such as general purpose trucks or air planes are 
illustrations’.124 
Physical asset and human asset specificity 
Menard claimed in relation to human specific assets that: 
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To be operationalized, this concept requires a sharp distinction between (a) skills that 
characterize human assets, that can be measured through qualifications at entry or 
qualifications acquired by training on the spot, and that are redeployable on the labor 
market; and (b) specific assets properly speaking, i.e., qualifications that are developed 
through interactions of agents operating within the organization and that are non-
redeployable on the market. There is almost no substitute for this human asset within the 
organisation or on the labor market and, symmetrically, it would be extremely difficult 
for the holder of this asset to trade this specific know-how on the labor market: therefore, 
a bilateral dependency develops. It is with this precise interpretation of specific human 
assets that we are concerned here. This distinction is essential in understanding why asset 
specificity can generate transaction costs for an organization, and also influence the 
choice of internal arrangement: in a firm, an employee may be extremely well-qualified, 
but easily replaceable; conversely, another employee may have low qualifications but be 
extremely specific because of some know-how again through his or her activity within 
the organisation.
125
 
In their study of 63 articles that adopted some form of TCE analysis, David and Han found 
that ‘[t]he most common measures [of asset specificity] used were specialized production 
assets (17 tests), specialized skills (12), and a composite measure of specialized assets and 
skills (17)’.126 Similarly, proxies for human asset specificity have included the ‘development 
and deepening of human skills’ developed in parts suppliers in the auto-industry127 and 
human capital or know-how in research and development (R&D) agreements.
128
 Pisano 
argued that: 
Because biotechnology is a technology-intensive industry, with relatively low physical 
capital requirements and few geographical restrictions, the type of transaction-specific 
assets most likely to affect collaborations are those related to human capital or know-
how. The dual presence of transaction-specific know-how and uncertainty depends on 
the activities of the collaboration. In biotechnology, the degree of uncertainty and 
transaction-specific know-how is greater in collaborations that encompass R&D than in 
those that involve the transfer, utilization, or commercialization of existing know-how. 
Examples of the latter type include agreements for technology transfer, manufacturing, 
materials supply, and marketing/distribution.
129
 
In his study of product procurement in the aerospace industry, Masten identified two species 
of asset specificity. The first of those, a proxy for physical asset specificity was ‘based on 
whether an item was identified as used exclusively by this company (highly specialized), 
used or easily adaptable for use by other aerospace firms (somewhat specialized), or used in 
other industries (relatively standard)’.130 Masten argued that ‘in sum, the more idiosyncratic 
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are the investments associated with a particular transaction, the greater are the incentives to 
incur the costs of writing more detailed and longer term contracts.’131  
An analogy can be drawn to the asset specificity in cross-border insolvencies. In cross-border 
insolvency transactions, examples of human asset specificity and physical asset specificity 
will be most likely. The human capital in know-how generated by those tasked with resolving 
complex cross-border insolvencies is specific to the transaction and company at hand. That 
know-how includes that which the insolvency representatives, lawyers and judges build up 
over the term of the insolvency. There will be a correlation between the level of complexity 
of the insolvency with the amount of human capital in know-how that is derived through 
close analysis of specific complex materials and innovative solutions to resolve these 
complexities. Also, the interaction between asset specificity and uncertainty is critical to a 
TCE analysis. Neither is studied without the contingent effect of the other. 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc in the United States which began in 
September 2008 provides further examples of asset specificity in cross-border insolvency. 
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy dealt with highly complex derivative swaps, repo 
transactions and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) created by Lehmans that were 
securities tied to specific assets, usually bundles of mortgages. The contracts that governed 
these transactions were often highly complex. Lehman Brothers was heavily reliant on these 
assets maintaining their value to provide security and Lehman Brothers entities around the 
world sold securities based on these assets maintaining their value. The insolvency 
representatives and judges in each jurisdiction in which Lehman Brothers operated have been 
required to come to terms with these transactions and understand their complexities. This 
knowledge and these skills, once the transaction is complete and the company is liquidated, 
lose their value and can therefore be classified as specific to the transaction. Another type of 
asset specificity which is prominent in cross-border insolvency is temporal specificity. 
Temporal specificity 
Masten, Meehan and Snyder developed Williamson’s original four examples of asset 
specificity and added what they referred to as temporal specificity which they described as 
follows: 
Where timely performance is critical, delay becomes a potentially effective strategy for 
exacting price concessions. Knowing that interruptions at one stage can reverberate 
throughout the rest of the project, an opportunistic supplier may be tempted to seek a 
larger share of the gains from trade by threatening to suspend performance at the last 
minute. Even though the skills and assets necessary to perform the task may be fairly 
common, the difficulty of identifying and arranging to have an alternative supplier in 
place on short notice introduces the prospect of strategic holdups.
132
 
In cross-border insolvency, timely performance is often crucial and representatives in other 
jurisdictions or of other affiliates of a company might seek to delay proceedings to benefit 
their own debtor’s interests. For example, in Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd v Lehman 
Brothers Special Financing Inc,
133
 Lehman Brothers Australia (LBA), in the face of extended 
stonewalling by the related Lehman Brothers entity, sought leave to serve an originating 
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process on Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (LBSF), in the United States. To do so, 
LBA needed to establish a prima facie case against LBSF in relation to a flip clause in a 
related party agreement. The flip clause was contained in the transaction documents between 
LBSF and LBA. Under the flip clause, if a swap agreement terminated early, ‘LBSF would 
be paid all moneys due to it in priority to note holders … unless LBSF was the defaulting 
party’.134 In that case, the right to payment would flip and the note holders would be entitled 
to payment. LBA had sought a declaration that, because LBSF had defaulted, under the flip 
clause, LBA was entitled to payment.
135
 Justice Rares summarised the conflicting findings 
that had already been made in similar proceedings in the United States and the United 
Kingdom on the same issue. On the basis of those conflicting decisions, LBSF had resisted 
payment to LBA. After several years of trying to negotiate payment, it was not until pressure 
was brought to bear on LBSF in the Australian Proceedings that a settlement was reached and 
LBA ultimately received payment. The liquidators of LBA had informed creditors that: 
… the conflicting judgments from the United Kingdom and the United States Courts 
continues to lock up any distribution of the underlying collateral. This is because BNY 
will not make distributions to Noteholders until there is final judicial clarity in all 
jurisdictions on the issue of the flip clause.
136
 
This is an example of temporal asset specificity in cross-border insolvency that would be 
considered high. 
The table below summarises the major examples of asset specificity in cross-border 
insolvency and gives each type a numerical value between 1 and 5. High levels of asset 
specificity would equate to levels 4 or 5. Moderate levels would be classified as between 2-3 
while low levels would be classified as 1. Levels of asset specificity to a ‘non-trivial 
degree’137 will still engender TCE results. David and Han opined that in all of the 63 papers 
analysed in their study of TCE, ‘it would be reasonable to assume that asset specificity was 
present “to a non-trivial degree”’.138 Only a single type of asset specificity need be apparent 
in cross-border insolvency.
139
 Therefore, a transaction that displays even non-trivial levels of 
one type of asset specificity will be sufficient to anchor a TCE analysis. It is then the 
interaction of uncertainty with asset specificity that determines appropriate governance 
modes. However, several types of asset specificity might appear for a given transaction type. 
Problems of quantifying asset specificity have been identified in the studies 
Asset specificity Value 
Site specificity, where access to specific sites is necessary to gather 
information about the debtor 
1-5 
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Asset specificity Value 
Physical asset specificity, such as specialised computing software, and books 
and records 
1-5 
Human asset specificity that arises in learning by doing - The human capital in 
know-how generated in those tasked with resolving complex cross-border 
insolvencies is specific to the transaction and company at hand 
1-5 
Brand-name capital 1-5 
Dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in general-purpose plant that 
are made at the behest of a particular customer 
1-5 
Temporal specificity, which is akin to technological non-separability and can 
be thought of as a type of site specificity in which timely responsiveness by on-
site human assets is vital 
1-5 
 
4.2. Uncertainty 
As stated in Part 2 above, Justice Spigelman noted the following impediments to 
transnational transacting: 
 Uncertainty about the ability to enforce legal rights; 
 Additional layers of complexity; 
 Additional costs of enforcement; 
 Risks arising from unfamiliarity with foreign legal process; 
 Risks arising from unknown and unpredictable legal exposure; 
 Risks arising from lower levels of professional competence, including judicial 
competence; 
 Risks arising from inefficiencies in the administration of justice, and in some cases, of 
corruption
140
 
The Practice Guide too outlines the characteristics of transactions in cross-border 
insolvencies where cross-border insolvency agreements, a highly integrated form of cross-
border insolvency governance, might appropriately be used. These transactions include: 
 Cross-border insolvency proceedings with a considerable number of international (a)
elements, such as significant assets located in multiple jurisdictions;  
 A complex debtor structure (for example, an enterprise group with numerous (b)
subsidiaries) or complex intertwining of the operations of the debtor; 
 Legal uncertainty regarding the resolution of choice of law or choice of forum questions; (c)
 The ordering of contradictory stays in the different proceedings;  (d)
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 The existence of a cash management system providing for the deposit of cash into a (e)
centralized account and the sharing of cash among members of an international group of 
companies;  
 The employment of the insolvency representatives appointed to the different insolvency (f)
proceedings by the same international company.
141
 
These types of transactions display characteristics of uncertainty and complexity that, 
combined with a degree of asset specificity, would indicate that a more integrated mode of 
governance (such as limited universalism) would be the appropriate governance mode. 
Wouters and Raykin referred to the role of uncertainty in cross-border insolvency which, they 
said ‘diminishes incentives for cooperation between creditors’. They argued that: 
Absent a guarantee that other creditors will not attempt to open secondary proceedings, 
any creditor with a viable claim under Article 5 faces an anticommons problem – if every 
creditor is grabbing for their own best interest, why would one creditor sacrifice its own 
interests for the corporate group's collective good?
142
 
While the references to uncertainty by Spigelman and in the Practice Guide undoubtedly are 
notions of uncertainty to which TCE should pay attention, Williamson was especially 
interested in the cognitive ability and self-interest of human actors that create uncertainty. 
Opportunism – behavioural uncertainty 
TCE allows that human actors are rational but that rationality is bounded by an inability to 
control the complexity of ex-ante contracting for every possible contingency. Also, human 
actors are subject to opportunism which Williamson defines as ‘self-interest seeking with 
guile’.143 Williamson stated that ‘[c]ontracting agents are … assumed to be subject to 
bounded rationality and, where circumstances permit, are given to opportunism’.144 The 
combination of bounded rationality and opportunism leads to contracting situations where 
‘(1) all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete (by reason of bounded rationality); and 
(2) contractual hazards sometimes await (by reason of opportunism).’145 Williamson argued 
that these contractual hazards caused by opportunism, which he referred to as a form of 
‘behavioural uncertainty’,146 were ‘of special importance to an understanding of transaction 
cost economics issues.’147 He defined opportunism to include ‘subtle forms of deceit’ and 
argued that this behaviour included ‘calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, 
or otherwise confuse.’148 Williamson attributed to opportunism a purposeful ‘strategic 
nondisclosure, disguise, or distortion of information. … The conscious supply of false and 
misleading signals’.149 The opportunities for bankruptcy agents and creditors to engage in 
these types of behaviours in cross-border insolvencies are manifest. 
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Anderson stated that ‘… all agents will be opportunistic whenever they calculate that it will 
pay. The way to dampen opportunism is to develop protective governance structures which 
reduce the rewards of opportunism (even if undetected) or increase the penalties if 
detected.’150 She stated that ‘a central tenet of transaction cost analysis is that vertical 
integration reduces the level of opportunism practised by agents’. Williamson, too, argued 
that ‘increasing the degree of parametric uncertainty makes it more imperative to organize 
transactions within governance structures that have the capacity to “work things out”’.151 
Asymmetric information as opportunism in cross-border insolvency  
One outcome of this type of behaviour relevant to cross-border insolvencies is that it leads to 
asymmetric information disclosure so that some parties have more information upon which to 
make decisions than do others. Williamson argued that this ‘vastly complicates problems of 
economic organization’ and that ‘[b]oth principals and third parties (arbitrators, courts, and 
the like) confront much more difficult ex-post inference problems as a consequence.’152 He 
argued that parties should adopt appropriate governance mechanisms to deal with 
opportunism and that ‘[t]ransactions that are subject to ex post opportunism will benefit if 
cost-effective safeguards can be devised ex ante’.153 This entails a pre-emptive or predictive 
approach based upon anticipated high levels of uncertainty. 
Armour referred to the need for creditors to ideally make collective decisions. In language 
redolent of a TCE analysis, he noted that the ‘mechanism which is adopted for making 
decisions is crucial to the efficiency of the procedure’.154 In a tangential reference to 
opportunism that is borne of information asymmetry he stated: 
First, it will impact on the amount of time taken to resolve the issues. On the whole, the 
more quickly decisions can be taken, the lower the direct costs of financial distress. It 
seems plausible that rapid decision-making may reduce the ‘uncertainty costs’ of 
financial distress. Second, the accuracy of the decisions achieved by the procedure will 
improve the efficiency of the allocation of the firm’s assets ex-post. Third, the scope for 
strategic behaviour — which optimally will be minimised — largely depends on the 
procedure that is adopted.
155
 
Armour listed some of the factors that ‘inhibit collective decision-making by creditors’ in 
insolvency proceedings, including that ‘individual rights give [creditors] incentives to engage 
in strategic “hold-up” behaviour.’ Secondly, he stated that ‘asymmetric information between 
creditors is likely to lead to disputes over the best means of deploying the firm’s assets.’ 
Thirdly, he argued that ‘heterogeneous priorities amongst creditors give parties incentives to 
back outcomes which result in the largest payoffs to them’.156 All of these behaviours fall into 
the category of opportunistic behaviour which creates uncertainty in the insolvency process. 
Using a TCE analysis, in a cross-border insolvency context, the higher the uncertainty in a 
given transaction, the closer the governance mechanism for that transaction should be to 
universalism. 
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One way to address opportunism in relation to asymmetric information is to enter an 
agreement to govern information sharing. The UNCITRAL Practice Guide discusses the 
benefits of cross-border insolvency agreements in providing information to the relevant 
parties: 
In addition to the sharing of information between insolvency representatives, an 
insolvency agreement may address the sharing of that information with other parties, 
such as the courts involved and the creditors or creditor committee and, where there is 
more than one creditor committee, between those committees. Such provisions may be 
useful to provide a degree of certainty and avoid potential conflict. The agreement may 
require, for example, that information shared by the insolvency representatives, such as 
monthly reports on their activities, could also be provided to the creditors, the creditor 
committee or the courts. Additional information may be exchanged on request, either by 
an insolvency representative or by a creditor committee.
157
 
Again, it can be seen that a more integrated type of governance mode is most appropriate. 
Shelanski and Klein argued of TCE that ‘the effect of uncertainty on governance structure … 
hinges on asset specificity and the consequent bilateral dependency.’158 That is, where there 
is asset specificity, increasing levels of uncertainty requires that a more integrated 
governance structure be adopted.  
The table below summarises the major examples of uncertainty in cross-border insolvency 
and gives each example a numerical value. In this way, levels of uncertainty in cross-border 
insolvency transactions can be differentiated into high, medium and low. High uncertainty 
might be indicated by a level of 5 or more, intermediate levels of uncertainty might be 
between 3 and 5 while low uncertainty might be 2 or below. 
While some examples are arguably more uncertain than others, for example, exposure to 
lower levels of professional competence, including judicial competence would create great 
uncertainty, each example has been given the value of 1 to avoid problems with arbitrariness 
in calculation. Williamson argued that precise mathematical calculations are not required 
because TCE takes a comparative approach. He proposed scaling up rough or crude 
calculations when a new model is proposed.
 159
 In this way, problems with measurement can 
be avoided. In a multinational enterprise group situation, 1 point might be added for each 
country in which these issues arise.
160
 
Uncertainty Value 
Uncertainty about the ability to enforce legal rights 1 
Additional layers of complexity 1 
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Uncertainty Value 
Additional costs of enforcement 1 
Risks arising from unfamiliarity with foreign legal process 1 
Risks arising from unknown and unpredictable legal exposure 1 
Risks arising from lower levels of professional competence, including judicial 
competence 
1 
Risks arising from inefficiencies in the administration of justice, and in some 
cases, of corruption
161 
1 
Actual exposure to lower levels of professional competence, including judicial 
competence 
1 
Cross-border insolvency proceedings with a considerable number of 
international elements, such as significant assets located in multiple 
jurisdictions 
1 
A complex debtor structure (for example, an enterprise group with numerous 
subsidiaries) or complex intertwining of the operations of the debtor 
1 
Legal uncertainty regarding the resolution of choice of law or choice of forum 
questions 
1 
The ordering of contradictory stays in the different proceedings 1 
The existence of a cash management system providing for the deposit of cash 
into a centralized account and the sharing of cash among members of an 
international group of companies 
1 
The employment of the insolvency representatives appointed to the different 
insolvency proceedings by the same international company
162 
1 
Asymmetric information disclosure so that some parties have more information 
upon which to make decisions than do others leading to, for example (a) 
strategic “hold-up” behaviour, (b) disputes over the best means of deploying 
the firm’s assets, and (c) incentives to back outcomes which result in the 
largest payoffs to them
163
 
1 
Opportunism in the form of the grab for assets by local creditors in a 
territorialist state
164
 
1 
Cross-border insolvency that involves assets or subsidiaries in countries that 
are universalist (for example, have adopted the Model Law) and also assets or 
subsidiaries in countries that are territorialist. 
1 
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Uncertainty Value 
The use in multinational enterprise groups of competitor insolvency firms for 
each entity within the enterprise. 
1 
 
Also, the relative complexity of transactions must be considered in a TCE analysis. Again, to 
counter higher levels of complexity combined with high asset specificity and uncertainty 
requires a more integrated governance mode. Masten used complexity as a proxy for 
uncertainty. He stated that ‘Complexity … may be used as a proxy for the degree of 
uncertainty on the production side; the more complex a component, the more details to be 
accounted for and the more dimensions in which something can go wrong.’165  
4.3. Complexity 
While he did not specifically list complexity as an independent variable of transactions, 
Williamson did leave room for complexity as a distinct problem. He said that ‘[s]urprise 
moves often elicit complex replies. Bounded rationality limits are quickly reached-since the 
entire decision tree cannot be generated for even moderately complex problems’.166 As 
discussed, later studies using TCE incorporated complexity as a transaction characteristic. 
Shelanski and Klein included complexity as an independent variable.
167
 Macher and 
Richman
168
 and Joskow
169
 also include complexity as a distinguishing feature of transaction 
types. Like increasing levels of uncertainty, the effect of greater levels of complexity in 
transactions also drives the choice of governance mode to a more integrated type. Masten 
argued that: 
The greater the complexity of the transaction and the level of uncertainty associated with 
it, the greater the likelihood of being bound to an inappropriate action, and hence the 
greater the implicit costs of contractual organization. … In sum, the more idiosyncratic 
are the investments associated with a particular transaction, the greater are the incentives 
to incur the costs of writing more detailed and longer term contracts. Greater uncertainty 
or complexity of a transaction, however, implies, on the one hand, an incentive to write 
more detailed agreements and, on the other, a disincentive to commit to long term 
contractual relationships.
170
 
By way of example again, the complexity of the transactions in the Lehman Brothers 
insolvency, considered together with high levels of asset specificity and uncertainty would 
suggest that that particular insolvency would have been best governed using a highly 
integrated governance mode. 
The table below summarises some examples of complexity in cross-border insolvency and 
gives each example a numerical value. In this way, levels of complexity in cross-border 
insolvency transactions can be differentiated into high, medium and low. Some of these are 
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also included in the examples of uncertainty which shows the interaction between uncertainty 
and complexity referred to by Masten above. 
Complexity Value 
A complex debtor structure (for example, an enterprise group with numerous 
subsidiaries) or complex intertwining of the operations of the debtor 
1 
Legal uncertainty regarding the resolution of choice of law or choice of forum 
questions 
1 
Cross-border insolvency proceedings with a considerable number of 
international elements, such as significant assets located in multiple 
jurisdictions 
1 
The ordering of contradictory stays in the different proceedings 1 
Multiple computer systems being used by the debtor and its affiliates 1 
Highly complex asset structure such as finance transactions 1 
Interaction with complex legal issues subject to inconsistent laws in different 
countries 
1 
A very large scale transaction or multiple transactions 1 
 
4.4. Frequency 
The higher the frequency of transactions, the more cost effective it becomes to adopt a more 
integrated governance mode to govern it. Frequency, though, is not of itself a determining 
characteristic and must be considered amongst the other differentiating characteristics of 
asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity.  
Almost all the literature discussing cross-border insolvencies contains some assertion about 
the increasing incidence of cross-border insolvency claims in recent years. This assertion is 
usually tied to an increase in global trade.
171
 The data shows that global commerce has indeed 
increased.
172
 However, of the 40,075 business bankruptcy filings in the United States in 2012,
 
173
 121 cases were filed under Chapter 15,
174
 the Chapter of the United States Bankruptcy 
                                               
171
  See for example, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the United States of 
the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, 87 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL 247, 248 (2013): 
‘the number of insolvency cases involving a multinational debtor has risen with increasing globalisation. The 
flow has been a torrent since the near collapse of financial markets in 2008, developments which have stirred 
interest in the management of these cases.’ 
172
  World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2012, 204. Figures on the increased volume of 
world merchandise exports and gross domestic product, 1950-2011 which shows consistent growth from 
1950-2011 except for a sharp decline in 2009 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2012_e/its2012_e.pdf. 
173
  Kerry A Mastroianni, The 2013 Bankruptcy Yearbook & Almanac 4 (New Generation Research Inc 23
rd
 ed. 
2013). The 20 year average for business bankruptcies in the United States is 43,794 per year. The number of 
bankruptcies increased in 2009 (60,837) and 2010 (56,282) but had returned to slightly above average in 
2011 (47,806) and below average in 2012 (40,075). 
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Code dealing with cross-border insolvencies. It is interesting to note that, of the 577 Chapter 
15 filings between 2005 and 2011 reported by Westbrook, by far the biggest proportion of 
cases come from Canada (282 – 48%).175 In one respect, the increasing frequency and 
prevalence of cross-border insolvencies drives the governance mode for cross-border 
insolvencies toward a more hierarchical structure in each case. It is also a factor that 
highlights the increasing need for a more integrated and hierarchical governance mode such 
as pure universalism. However, it is the frequency of transactions within the cross-border 
insolvency itself that is pertinent for a study using TCE. 
This is evidenced in the Lehman Brothers proceedings which have been ongoing since 
15 September 2008. The number of transactions that have been conducted in those 
proceedings in that timeframe is extremely high. These have included court applications for 
cross-border insolvency specific matters such as recognition, stays, injunctions and 
declarations. The transactions also included claims and suits involving parties in foreign 
jurisdictions including related entities. They also have included cataloguing and responding 
to creditor claims from multiple jurisdictions. This highly frequent recurrence of complex 
transactions is relevant to the analysis of transaction types in TCE. An insolvency with 
frequent transactions, such as the Lehman Brothers proceedings, when considered with high 
levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity, again adds to the call for 
implementing a more hierarchical and integrated system of governance such as universalism. 
The table below sets a number for a given frequency of transactions in cross-border 
insolvencies. In this way, levels of frequency of transactions can be differentiated into high, 
medium and low. 
Frequency Value 
More than 20 interactions or transactions between jurisdictions to complete the 
insolvency 
3 
Between 10 and 20 interactions or transactions to complete the insolvency 
2 
Fewer than 10 interactions or transactions to complete the insolvency 
1 
 
5. Aligning transaction types with governance modes 
TCE aligns the transaction types with appropriate insolvency governance structures to create 
efficiencies. Given the raft of governance modes available as listed above, a theory that 
predicts appropriate governance modes from various transaction matrices could be extremely 
useful in choosing the most transaction cost efficient governance mode for cross-border 
insolvency. As discussed, the three relevant governance structures, adopting the TCE 
methodology, are universalism, various hybrid modes between universalism and territoriality 
and a modified form of territoriality. David and Han summarised what they derived as the 
                                                                                                                                                  
174
  id. at 19. In the 7 years from 2006 to 2012 there were 632 filings under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code. In the 7 years before Chapter 15 was enacted (1999 to 2005), there were 456 filings under Section 304 
of the US Bankruptcy Code, the previous section dealing with Cross-border insolvency. In 2004-5 there 
were 173 filings under Section 304. In 2011-12 there were 179 filings under Chapter 15. 
175
  Westbrook, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL, 253 (2013). This figure rises to 65% when the United 
Kingdom claims are included (101). 
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‘core tenets’ of TCE as it applies to the make or buy decision. Modifying this to apply to 
cross-border insolvency as proposed in this paper, results in the following predictions: 
1. As asset specificity increases, the transaction costs associated with [territoriality] increase. 
2. As asset specificity increases, hybrids and [universalism] become preferred over 
[territoriality]; at high levels of asset specificity, [universalism] becomes the preferred 
governance form. 
3. When asset specificity is present to a nontrivial degree,176 uncertainty raises the transaction 
costs associated with [territoriality]. 
4. … 
5. When both asset specificity and uncertainty are high, [universalism] is the most cost-
effective governance mode. 
6. Governance modes that are aligned with transaction characteristics should display 
performance advantages over other modes; for example, when both asset specificity and 
uncertainty are high, [universalism] should display performance advantages over 
[territoriality] and hybrids.
177
 
As stated, TCE predicts that transactions with a high degree of asset specificity, and also high 
levels of uncertainty, complexity and frequency, will be more efficiently governed under a 
more integrated or hierarchical governance mode such as universalism. Conversely, those 
transactions with low asset specificity and low levels of uncertainty, complexity and 
frequency will be more efficiently governed under a modified territorialist regime. Those 
transactions that display intermediate levels of each aspect will be best governed using a 
hybrid form of governance such as available under the umbrella of modified universalism. At 
the point of insolvency in a cross-border insolvency, we can summarise the governance 
choices available against the transaction cost framework as set out in the table below: 
 Asset specificity Uncertainty Complexity 
Frequency of 
transactions 
Universalism 
Intermediate to 
high 
Intermediate to 
high 
High 
Intermediate to 
high 
Hybrid – 
Modified 
Universalism 
Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate 
Modified 
Territoriality 
Non-trivial 
degree
178
 
Low Low Low 
 
5.1. Case study: Lehman Brothers Holdings Limited 
An example to illustrate the application of TCE to cross-border insolvency is the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brother Holdings Inc (LBHI) which filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings on 
                                               
176
  WILLIAMSON, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 60 (1985). 
177
 David & Han, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 41–2 (2004). 
178
  WILLIAMSON, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 60 (1985): 
‘whenever assets are specific in nontrivial degree, increasing the degree of uncertainty makes it more 
imperative that the parties devise machinery to “work things out”’. 
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15 September 2008. That filing spawned over 80 bankruptcy proceedings around the world
179
 
including amongst companies within the Lehman Brothers Group. Before filing Chapter 11 
proceedings, the Lehman Brothers Group consisted of ‘over 7000 legal entities in 40 
countries.’180 According to the Debtors’ Amended Response to Objections to Approval of 
Proposed Disclosure Statement filed in the United States proceedings ‘The chaos that ensued 
was unprecedented and presented the potential for highly fractious proceedings permeated by 
years of extended, complex and expensive litigation among competing interests and 
entities’.181 
Similar proceedings were invoked in relation to Lehman Brothers subsidiaries and their 
affiliates in Europe, Asia and Australia among other regions. Groups of Lehman Brothers 
affiliates in each broad jurisdiction, for example, the United States, Europe, Asia and 
Australia, retained their own insolvency professionals, mostly large accounting firms who 
had the experience and resources to undertake such a task. Alvarez & Marsal was appointed 
as the professional services firm to LBHI and its affiliates in the United States. In the United 
Kingdom, PricewaterhouseCoopers was appointed as the administrator for Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe). In Asia, KPMG was the firm appointed and, in Australia, the large 
advisory firm PPB Advisory. Each of these insolvency firms is a competitor of the other, 
each also has concomitant obligations to obtain the best outcome for creditors of its 
respective entities. Without more, the environment for opportunism and uncertainty is set. 
The assets involved in the Lehman Brothers proceedings have become highly specific and 
include complex global equity investments and derivative transactions created by specialist 
staff with industry specific knowledge. Unwinding and resolving these transactions will 
require human specific assets with specialist skills. As mentioned earlier, temporal specificity 
is also present. On the scale outlined above, the level of asset specificity is probably a 4 or 5 
out of 5. 
Such a complex insolvency creates high levels of legal and structural uncertainty for all 
participants. Every example of uncertainty listed above is evidenced in the Lehman Brothers 
insolvency. This equates to a score of 18 for uncertainty which is in the high bracket. Levels 
of complexity are also high and each of the 8 indicators of complexity listed above are 
present. Similarly, many more than 20 interactions or transactions between jurisdictions have 
been implemented and many more will continue to be required to complete the insolvency. 
For all of the independent variables of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and 
frequency, the Lehman Brothers proceedings score high. On that analysis, this proceeding 
should have been governed using the most integrated form of governance; that is, 
universalism. The hazards of not doing this have become clear as the proceedings have 
evolved. 
On May 12, 2009, LBHI and a number of its debtor and non-debtor affiliates entered the 
Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies (Protocol) 
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  Debtors’ Amended Response to Objections to Approval of Proposed Disclosure Statement, In re Lehman 
Bros. Holdings, No. 08-13555 (Bankr. SDNY Aug 23, 2011), para [1], retrieved from 
http://bankrupt.com/misc/LBHI_SummaryRespDSObjections.pdf. 
180
  Lehman Brothers press release 26 May 2009 retrieved from 
http://dm.epiq11.com/LBH/Document/GetDocument/1315906. 
181
  Debtors’ Amended Response to Objections to Approval of Proposed Disclosure Statement, In re Lehman 
Bros. Holdings, No. 08-13555 (Bankr. SDNY Aug 23, 2011), para [1]. 
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that established an agreed framework to govern the conduct of the various proceedings 
worldwide.
182
 Its intended benefits are set out in that document: 
Given the integrated and global nature of Lehman’s businesses, many of the Debtors’ 
assets and activities are spread across different jurisdictions, and require administration 
in and are subject to the laws of more than one Forum. The efficient administration of 
each of the Debtors’ individual Proceedings would benefit from cooperation among the 
Official Representatives. In addition, co-operation and communication among Tribunals, 
where possible, would enable effective case management and consistency of 
judgments.
183
 
The Protocol represents an attempt to govern the insolvency process that exhibits high levels 
of cooperation between and among courts and insolvency professionals and coordination of 
court proceedings and asset recovery and could best be described as exhibiting the 
characteristics of ‘modified’ universalism. As discussed in Chapter 6, cross-border 
insolvency agreements are increasingly prevalent. TCE predicts that adopting this 
hierarchical governance mode for the Lehman Brothers proceedings will create transaction 
cost efficiencies. According to TCE, such an insolvency would be less transaction cost 
efficient if a territorialist approach was implemented in each separate jurisdiction in which a 
Lehman Brothers subsidiary had conducted business or held assets. 
In one respect, the Lehman Brothers proceedings have provided a model for the dissolution 
of groups in insolvency because disparate Lehman Brothers entities entered a protocol with 
the parent company to ensure, as best they could, that these debtors cooperated among 
themselves. According to a Lehman Brothers press release in May 2009, ‘the protocol 
attempts to alleviate both the disruption resulting from these filings as well as the lack of an 
international governing body with uniform oversight over these proceedings by ensuring 
cooperation and coordination among the various administrators.’184 On the other hand, 
several high profile entities, including Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) in the 
United Kingdom and administered by PriceWaterhouse Coopers, did not enter the Protocol. 
PwC has subsequently announced that it will achieve a surplus of approximately £5 million in 
the insolvency proceedings in the United Kingdom.
185
 A report on the administration noted 
that ‘PwC is on course to receive £1bn in fees from the administration which Lomas has 
previously warned could take at least another 10 years. More than 500 people are employed 
on the administration’.186 This does not include the fees of the teams of lawyers retained to 
provide legal advice on the matter. A report in 2012, four years after the bankruptcy filing of 
LBHI, noted that ‘Some 500 former employees of the European arm of the bank remain on 
the payroll while administrators PricewaterhouseCoopers have 300 staff working on 
unravelling the operation. Payouts for around 6,000 creditors have been delayed by a series of 
complex court judgments’.187 
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  Epic Systems, Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies (Approved 
by the Court on June 17, 2009) retrieved from 
http://dm.epiq11.com/LBH/Document/#maxPerPage=25&page=1. 
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  Ibid p 2.  
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  Lehman Brothers press release 26 May 2009, note 17 above. 
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  Jill Treanor, ‘Lehman Brothers administrators left with £5bn surplus after creditors paid’, The Guardian, 
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  Jill Treanor, ‘Lehman administrators earn £500m in fees’, The Guardian, (13 April 2012), retrieved from 
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In the end, several of the Lehman Brothers subsidiaries entered the Protocol. However, it is 
notable that PwC, representing Lehman Brothers International (Europe) and a number of 
other Lehman European subsidiaries refused to enter the Protocol. In its fourteenth progress 
report, for the period 15 March 2015 to 14 September 2015, PwC reported that the 
administration of LBIE would return a surplus of between £7.3 billion and £7.7 billion.
188
 
Given the positive outcome for LBIE and its creditors, it is easy to understand the reluctance 
of LBIE and PwC to enter any protocol that could jeopardise that position. However, it is also 
a clear indication of the potential for and the damage that can be caused by opportunism 
when the separate legal entity doctrine is adhered to and parties choose not to cooperate. A 
system of pure universalism in which one court would resolve all claims in relation to all 
entities would arguably result in a fairer outcome for all creditors, not only those of LBIE. 
6. Normative Argument for Pure Universalism 
The UNCITRAL Model Law does not apply to separate entities within a larger corporate 
enterprise. Each separate entity must file a main proceeding in its COMI state. This entails 
multiple main proceedings that are ostensibly unconnected. The Model Law allows for 
coordination between disparate primary and secondary proceedings involving the same 
debtor but does not apply directly to ameliorate proceedings involving separate legal entities. 
The separate legal entity doctrine is too entrenched. In these circumstances, because no 
global law exists, Lubben and Woo argue that efficiencies can be had if ‘the main 
proceedings are linked together through accords or protocols entered into by the principals in 
those proceedings. That is, contract fills the gap left by statute.’189 These types of cross-
border insolvency agreements (such as the Lehman Brothers Protocol) are an example of 
modified universalism. As described, modified universalism is not the most integrated form 
of governance that can be imagined; pure universalism remains a goal. Lubben and Woo 
argued that the separate legal entity doctrine should be subverted when large multinational 
financial institutions (such as banks) are involved. They proposed that, ‘where the horizontal 
linkages among firms are extreme, reorganization is the only way to avoid systemic collapse. 
Thus, it may be quite necessary to harm the “lesser” entities in order to avoid the disruption 
that would result from the collapse of the core of the enterprise’.190 This is akin to substantive 
consolidation of entities within the corporate enterprise. While Lubben and Woo’s arguments 
refer specifically to financial institutions, this could equally be argued to apply to all 
multinational enterprise groups where sufficient transaction characteristics exist. 
Westbrook argued the benefits of a global law to govern cross-border insolvencies. Such a 
convention he said would require ‘a single law and a single forum to govern each … case’.191 
These could be achieved by either establishing ‘unified international institutions, or a unified 
set of conflicts rules’.192 Westbrook’s preferred approach would be to ‘establish a single 
international bankruptcy law and a single international bankruptcy court system’. This, he 
argued was because choice-of-law rules are ‘notoriously non-uniform and unpredictable, so a 
single law is, in principle, much more desirable from an ex ante perspective’.193 Westbrook 
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  PricewaterhouseCoopers, Lehman Brothers International (Europe) – In Administration, joint administrators' 
14th progress report, for the period from 15 March 2015 to 14 September 2015, (12 October 2015), at 14, 
retrieved from http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/lbie-14th-progress-report.pdf. 
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argued that a pure universalist system, one in which there would be one court system 
applying one law in relation to cross-border insolvencies around the world, would: 
 produce a far higher level of predictability in commercial transactions than we now have; 
 maximize asset values, even in liquidation, by providing a unified approach to assembly 
and sale of assets as a whole; 
 If it commanded a worldwide stay, could most effectively protect those assets prior to 
sale; 
 make preventing or undoing debtor fraud far easier and more certain, an especially 
urgent goal in a world of electronic funds transfers and asset protection trusts; 
 lower the risk of parochialism in the administration of the case; 
 create a single set of priorities and method of distribution, ensuring equality for 
stakeholders with similar legal rights everywhere in the world; and 
 provide one consistent set of transfer-avoidance rules (such as preference and fraudulent 
conveyance avoidance), so that creditors would know the rules and would know they 
were protected against strategic behaviour by debtors and other creditors.
194
 
‘The consequence’ Westbrook argued ‘would be a great reduction in risk premiums and 
transaction costs and a great increase in fairness and efficiency.
195
 These are lofty aims and 
lofty claims but, as discussed, on a normative analysis based on an application of TCE, such a 
system would provide the most integrated and hierarchical system of governance and should 
be implemented. The reasons that this system has not been adopted include the economic and 
real politick costs of setting up and running it, including the resistance by most nations to 
intrusions on their national sovereignty. 
The economic costs of implementing such governing scheme with a single court system set 
up (for example, in New York) with global reach, implementing a single insolvency law 
would include (a) the costs to develop and maintain the system and (b) the costs and other 
impediments to insolvent debtors and global creditors in accessing and using the system. 
However, once the initial setup costs had been sunk, there would not be a need to continually 
incur those costs. It is also argued that accessing and using such a system could only be cost 
effective in certain circumstances – for example in a case such as the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy. Westbrook acknowledged that establishing a system to implement pure 
universalism in which there would be ‘a single law and a single forum to govern each 
multinational case’196 was ‘implausible, but not … impossible’197 and that ‘a truly 
universalist system may be many years away’.198 The impediments would seem to be 
insurmountable, at least in the short term. However, these impediments do not impinge on the 
extremely attractive normative arguments based on the TCE analysis in this paper for such a 
system. This is an open question for further research based upon costing a full universalist 
system but such an analysis is outside the scope of this paper. 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper examined the governance structures available to debtors and creditors in cross-
border insolvencies including universalism, hybrid modes of universalism and territoriality. A 
transaction cost economics analysis of these structures should be able to determine which is 
the most efficient, given variations in transactions. This should give participants in cross-
border insolvencies more certainty and increase the efficiency of cross-border insolvencies. If 
TCE theory applies as suggested, given the various differences in asset specificity, 
uncertainty, complexity and frequency in given transactions, parties should be able to align 
the most transaction cost efficient governance structure to appropriate transaction matrices 
before, or at the time the insolvency commences.  
The paper provides the structure that might be used to further apply TCE to cross-border 
insolvency. The relevant governance modes are set on a spectrum between universalism at 
one end and territoriality at the other. The hybrid modes of governing cross-border 
insolvencies lie between these two ends and take the form of variations on modified 
universalism. Once the governance modes are set, the different transaction types can be 
delineated using the independent variables: asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and 
frequency of transaction. Those cross-border insolvencies, such as the insolvency of LBHI 
that display high levels of these variables, are arguably best governed using the most 
integrated and hierarchical form of governance available to the parties. Reducing duplication 
and creating greater certainty in the process of using an integrated governance mode realises 
transaction cost efficiencies for these types of transactions. 
Conversely, cross-border insolvency transactions that display low levels of the independent 
variables will obtain transaction cost efficiency by allowing the parties, including local 
creditors, to resolve the transaction at a local level using local agents and court processes. In 
this way, the costs of developing and implementing a more hierarchical governance structure 
are averted and transaction cost savings ensue. 
A TCE analysis of cross-border insolvency provides a new way of viewing the debate 
between universalism and territoriality that has dominated the literature on cross-border 
insolvencies to date. This new approach adds to the literature and proposes a new way of 
analysing these theories. The following policy outcomes from the research in this thesis 
might be argued: 
 A predictive tool to allow participants in cross-border insolvencies to predict the most 
transaction cost efficient means of governing various cross-border insolvency transaction 
types based upon the likely levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and 
frequency of the transactions. 
 The research provides support for the normative argument to implement pure 
universalism at a global level to govern the most complex cross-border insolvencies, 
including those of multinational enterprise groups. 
 The concessions granted in the Model Law to appease state sovereignty concerns are 
anathema to pure universalism. The aim of universalists is to implement a system of 
universalism on a global basis. Presumably, the aim is to eventually remove these 
territorialist concessions. However, an application of TCE as proposed in this paper 
suggests that there are transaction cost efficiencies in retaining some territorialist 
elements as a means of governing some transaction types. Those developing and 
implementing global laws may consider retaining some system of territoriality to be 
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implemented as the transaction type requires. This might have interest at the global level 
with UNCITRAL and also at a local level when states are considering implementing a 
cross-border insolvency provisions into their national laws. 
The application of TCE to cross-border insolvency as proposed in this paper is obviously 
only in its seminal stages. The case study chosen (Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc) provides 
enough confirmation of the TCE methodology to warrant further and more detailed research 
in the area. Only in this way, as stated by Williamson, can a more authoritative statement be 
made on the applicability of the theory and a more authoritative and predictive theory can be 
developed. 
